Nikita Khrushchev outlines a proposal to the CPSU CC Presidium for a significant reduction in the USSR's armed forces by 1 to 1.5 million personnel, even without reciprocal actions from other countries. He argues that the Soviet Union's advancements in missile technology and nuclear capabilities ensure its defense without the need for a large standing army, thereby enhancing economic efficiency and bolstering international prestige. Khrushchev emphasizes that such unilateral disarmament would reduce Cold War tensions, undermine militaristic factions globally, and improve the Soviet Union’s image as a proponent of peace. He suggests transitioning to a mixed system of professional and territorial (militia) forces to maintain readiness while lowering costs. The proposal aims to strengthen both domestic and international support for the USSR while showcasing the superiority of the socialist system.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

The Swedish government rejected Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp’s proposals to fund a nuclear weapons program. This INR report from March 1967 on proposed cuts in defense spending suggested that the possibility that Sweden would acquire nuclear weapons had grown even more remote.

In a move interpreted by INR as part of a pro-nuclear “propaganda campaign,” Swedish Supreme Commander Torsten Rapp reportedly asked for funds for to cover the costs of nuclear weapons acquisition.

INR estimated that the Soviets wanted to “play upon French concern” that West Germany might acquire nuclear weapons through new NATO nuclear arrangements, such as the MLF.

Ambassador Livingston Merchant, who was responsible for the U.S. diplomatic effort to win support for the MLF, asked INR to report on the degree to which non-nuclear European members of NATO were satisfied with their “lack of a share in ownership or control of nuclear weapons.” Based on the evidence, mainly various statements made by leading politicians, diplomats, and policymakers, INR experts concluded that most of the countries surveyed (Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Greece) were “relatively satisfied,” while only West Germany was “restive” to the extent that some of its officials were interested in a NATO or European nuclear force.

INR analysts pointed to events during mid-February 1963 which suggested that the Soviet leadership was taking steps to spend a greater share of the gross national product on military resources.

As discussion of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) unfolded, unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

This DIA article briefly describes Iraq’s effort to procure aluminum tubes from 1986 to 1991 and discusses the potential for their use for conventional military purposes.