The French began working on this project again. The two sides compare how Iran is doing compared to other countries in nuclear energy. Berthelt will conduct further dialogue with President Etemad.

Hans-Hilger Haunschild provides an update on Iran's order of nuclear power plants from West Germany. He comments on the prospects for increased German-Iranian trade, problems of spent fuel reprocessing, the timeline for conclusion of agreements with Iran, Iran's negotiations with France, and a sea water desalination plant.

This is a letter anticipating Rohwedder's visit with Dr. Etemad in Iran and gives a brief of what to discuss.

An employee of the Deutsche Kraftwerksunion (KWU) writes to Klaus Barthelt, the Chairman of the Board, about enrichment negotiations with the Soviet Union in the context of an upcoming meeting with the President of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The author also describes a meeting with another Iranian official who described Tehran's annoyance with France.

Nonproliferation talks entered their decisive phase after the submission of a joint U.S.-Soviet draft to the ENDC on February 21, 1967. One week later, High-Commissioner of the French Commissariat à l’énergie atomique, Francis Perrin, assessed France’s options. It was not “by accident,” he noted, the original five UN Security Council permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China—were in line for nuclear-club membership: “…they are the same profound reasons, of a geographical, demographic or other nature, which led to the choice [in 1945] … of the countries with special responsibilities in the maintenance of world peace.” After noting how advances in “India, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and also West Germany” portended the further spread of nuclear weapons—and acknowledging France had itself sought help with its weapon program—Perrin pondered whether proliferation might hasten nuclear disarmament by convincing the superpowers of its merits. In the end, however, fear of a “large and hostile” nuclear-armed PRC made him pessimistic. While he did not advise signing the NPT, it would be “very important” for France to affirm publicly, if unilaterally, “its constant policy since 1958 … not to cede any atomic weapon or any atomic explosive device to a country which does not possess it, and not to help any such country to manufacture them.” He dismissed internal opposition toward the NPT as defensive—"an a posteriori justification of the French decision to constitute an atomic armament." More significant was the likelihood West Germany would gain its own atomic arsenal, jeopardizing France’s “dominant political position among the Europe of the Six” members of the European Communities and reviving Cold War tensions in Europe. He finished with an eye-opening analysis of how the Kosygin proposal for nuclear-weapon states to extend negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states’ signatory to the NPT would not impede the use of French nuclear armaments against a West German blitzkrieg backed by the United States.

Note concerning uranium enrichment plant proposed by the French government.

Report by CNEN on the visit by CNEN personnel and industrial experts to CEA plants and French facilities for uranium-enrichment.

Pierre Laurent of the French Department of Scientific Affairs describes the first Indian nuclear test and the resulting reevaluation of French nuclear cooperation with India. New guarantees are suggested to ensure that French-supplied nuclear technology and materials could not be used in future Indian nuclear explosions.

Report on Indira Gandhi's response to the negative international reaction to the first Indian nuclear test. In contrast to other countries, André Giraud, the head of the French Commision for Atomic Energy, sent a congratulatory telegram following the successful test.

The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports that an agreement has been signed for cooperation between India and France for nuclear research.