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October 20, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam, 'Reactions to China's Testing of an Atomic Bomb (6)'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam entails positive responses of Le Duan, Pham Hùng and Ly Ban regarding China's first testing of an Atomic Bomb.

October 18, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia, 'Reactions to China's Nuclear Test'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia describing positive responses from Indonesian government officials and foreign government officials in Indonesia regarding China's nuclear test.

October 19, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Algeria, 'Reactions to China's Testing of a Nuclear Bomb'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Algeria describes positive responses of foreign government officials stationed in Algeria on China's first nuclear weapons test.

May 19, 1965

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan, 'Reactions to China's Nuclear Test'

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan describes different responses of Pakistani government officials and foreign government diplomats in Pakistan regarding China's first nuclear weapons test.

October 16, 1964

Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China

The Government of China announces its successful nuclear test but states that it will follow a no first use policy and in fact desires for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

May 30, 1967

Intelligence Note 418 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Probable Effects of Chinese Possession of MRBMs on Vietnam War'

A prospective Chinese MRBM force led INR to consider whether Beijing would believe that it had more freedom of action to step up its involvement in the Vietnam War: it “might feel freer in extending aid to Hanoi and becoming more involved in the war if US pressure on the North Vietnamese seemed to require it.”

March 27, 1967

Intelligence Note 242 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Peking May Have ICBMs in 1971'

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

January 11, 1967

Intelligence Note 13 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'The Chinese Nuclear Threat to Non-Communist Asia'

Prepared by Edward Hurwitz, a Foreign Service officer and future ambassador then on assignment to INR, this report treated ICBMs as China’s main weapons goal, an eventual means for a “credible threat” to Beijing’s U.S. and Soviet “arch enemies.”

April 23, 1965

Intelligence Note from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Will Communist China Assist Other Nations in Acquiring Nuclear Weapons?'

Only months after China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, INR looked into whether Beijing would help other nations get the bomb.

October 1, 1962

Research Memorandum RFE-44 from Roger Hilsman to Acting Secretary, 'Japan’s Reaction to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation'

This “Limited Distribution” report on possible Japanese reactions did not anticipate that a test would cause basic changes in US-Japan security relations or in Tokyo’s general approach to nuclear weapons.

Pagination