Christopher Audland, a political officer at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, learned from the Canadian Charge d'Affaires that the information on the Argentine-Israel uranium deal "did not originate in Buenos Aires," and that the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission had made previous uranium sales to West Germany and to Israel in 1962. Minutes are attached.

In a letter to Arthur Kellas, counselor at the British Embassy in Tel Aviv, Alan Goodison of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department disclosed the Argentine-Israel uranium deal, which involved the transfer of 80-100 tons over 33 months. Since evidence suggested that Israel had facilities for plutonium separation, they estimated that there would be enough plutonium for a weapon within 20 months; however, Goodison had no proof that the Israelis planned to produce a nuclear weapon, only that they had the capability to do so. Minutes are attached.

This letter describes a meeting between Peter Ramsbotham, chief of the chancery at the British Embassy in France, and George Soutou, a senior official at the French Foreign Ministry. Soutou acknowledged that the French believed that the Israelis were attempting to "put themselves in a position to make a nuclear bomb if they wanted to." The French-Israeli agreement did not include a condition that prevented the use of non-French uranium for Dimona, and Ramsbotham wondered whether the French should be told about the Argentine-Israeli secret deal. Minutes of a conversation with Arkell of the Defense Intelligence Staff are attached.

After analyzing photographs taken of the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona, J. Koop, a career intelligence analyst at Canada's Defence Research Board, concluded in March 1964 that Dimona had all of the "prerequisites for commencing a modest nuclear weapons development project." When the Dimona reactor went critical, it could produce enough plutonium for at least one implosion device by the end of 1965 and increase its operating level to produce one to two per year by 1966. Arthur Kellas, a British diplomat in Israel, wrote in his forwarding letter that they were highly impressed by the analysis.

Peter Ramsbotham, chief of the chancery at the British Embassy in France, passed along information to the US Embassy about his meeting with George Soutou, a senior official at the French Foreign Ministry. While the French by then did not want Israel to acquire nuclear weapons, they believed that the Israelis were seeking them.

According Jacques Martin, a French Foreign Ministry expert, the Israelis were demanding to know why the French were holding up uranium shipments. The French replied that until Israel was ready to purchase only from France, allowing France “some control over the situation” [in Dimona], the restrictions would continue.

This telegram, sent through the special “Roger channel” used for intelligence subjects, refers to an earlier embassy message, number 2319, dated November 12, 1963, which has yet to be found at the US at the National Archives. That telegram may refer to French actions to halt the supply of uranium to Israel which were alluded to indirectly in this message. Jacques Martin, a French Foreign Ministry expert on nuclear matters, told US embassy officials that the Israelis, who had refused to sign an agreement to purchase uranium exclusively from France, were looking for other sources, most likely Belgium and Argentina.

This memorandum from Executive Secretary Benjamin Read of the Department of State to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy provides a valuable chronology of the US discovery of the nuclear reactor project at Dimona and the pledges made by the Israelis in response to requests from the United States. Included in the chronology is an item about a meeting on 25 May 1963 where senior French diplomat Charles Lucet told CIA director John McCone that even though the French had helped build the Dimona reactor, “there might be a nuclear complex not known the French.” Lucet further stated that the Israelis had tried to purchase “safeguard-free” uranium from Gabon but that the French government stopped the sale through preemptive purchases.

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

Chief of Staff of Israel Defense Forces, General Rafael Eitan writes to South African Minister of Defence Magnus Malan shortly after Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In this candid letter, Eitan states that Israel’s “iron determination” would not “allow these crazy Arabs to possess nuclear weapons," adding that "anyone who tries to say that the nuclear reactor in Iraq was only for research purposes is wicked, cynical and oil, not human blood, flows in his veins."