Aiken’s landmark address to the plenary of the UN General Assembly on 19 September 1958 launched his non-proliferation campaign. It is the first time he publicly identified stopping the spread of nuclear weapons as a concrete step in the collective interest to unblock the disarmament impasse, preventing a runaway arms race among the powers of the Earth. It was clearly framed as part of his wider campaign for global governance based on the rule of law rather than the threat of force. For Aiken, the challenge was stabilizing the arms race and generating trust to construct a world order based on justice and law – “to preserve a Pax Atomica while we build a Pax Mundi.” This speech was a critical departure. The widespread positive reception encouraged Aiken, persuading him to draft a formal resolution.

Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.

The president of the Mexican delegation to the United Nations (UN), Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, explained why the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) would represent the most ambitious regional project to address nuclear perils. He explained the security implications of the agreement, especially in terms of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and negative security assurances. He also clarified that the Latin American project would benefit signatories economically. He argued that Latin American governments would not have to waste the resources necessary to engage in nuclear arms races if the region were denuclearized. Moreover, he explained that Mexico’s final aim was to achieve general and complete disarmament; thus, Mexican authorities saw the NPT as a means and not a goal on its own.

The author of “New Roads to Disarmament," Alva Myrdal was head of Swedish disarmament policy from 1962 to 1973. In her 1967 paper presented at the Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, Belgrade, and Zagreb in 1967, Myrdal positions nuclear disarmament in its broader context and elaborates on her visions of a new world order. She would publicize many of these same thoughts and observations in her 1976 book, The Game of Disarmament. How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race. In 1982, she received the Nobel Peace Prize for her work on disarmament.

This document contains a list of directives to the Soviet delegation at the 23rd Session of the UNGA which focus on a Soviet government memorandum that was submitted by the Soviet government for addition to the session's agenda. The initial directives instruct the delegation to emphasize the urgency that, to the Soviet government, befits the serious need to terminate the arms race and start making concrete steps towards disarmament. Later directives call attention to discussions held between the Soviet government and those of other socialist countries, as well as additions to the resolution of the UNGA proposed by Western countries that the Soviet government finds unacceptable. Nonetheless, the delegation is to bring the Memorandum to the attention of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENCD) for consideration.

Gromyko asks U Thant to include the "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on Some Urgent Measures to End the Arms Race and Disarmament" on the agenda of the 23rd Session of the UNGA. He also extolls the signing of the NPT as an opportunity to create better conditions for the termination of the arms race and as a starting point for further international agreements on the issues of disarmament and the termination of the usage of nuclear weapons. Gromyko also asks Thant to share the Memorandum in the capacity of an official document on the UNGA.

This memo contains a list of items on the agenda in preparation for the XXIII Session of the General Assembly. Some of the listed items on the agenda include instructing Gromyko to put the "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on Some Urgent Measures to End the Arms Race and Disarmament" on the agenda of the 23rd Session of the UNGA and approve the directives of the delegation of the USSR to the 23rd Session of the UNGA. This memo also includes a list of logistical preparations for the Soviet delegation, including approving a list of advisers and experts for the Soviet delegation, as well as means of transportation to the 23rd Session in New York for the USSR, Ukrainian SSR, Belarussian SSR, and potentially the Mongolian SR upon request.

In his note to the CPSU CC, Gromyko writes that the Soviet MFA should reach out to Pope Paul VI about supporting the NPT. As the Pope has spoken out against the arms race before, Gromyko is optimistic that the treaty will gain support from the Vatican. This would exert influence on other Catholic countries to support the treaty as well.

This document contains instructions to the Soviet ambassador to meet with the Deputy Secretary of State of the Vatican and notify him of confidential information that needs to be brought to Pope Paul VI. In light of mutual understanding between the Vatican and the USSR on the importance of nuclear disarmament, the ambassador is requested to ask the Pope to utilize any diplomatic means at his disposal to help bring about the quickest possible conclusion to the NPT negotiations.

The CPSU CC outlines the details and logistics of the NPT's signing in Moscow. Along with nominating a reception hall and authorizing Gromyko to sign the treaty, this decree focuses on the publication of an official memorandum suggesting urgent measures to end the arms race.