Todor Zhivkov reports his impressions of his recent visit to Cuba. The report is a rough outline of topics ranging from advancements in the Cuban revolution since 1959 to prospective ways to improve Bulgarian-Cuban relations. In the report Zhivkov presents his assessment of the Cuban Communist Party congress. Party documents show a maturing understanding of Marxism-Leninism and a new clarity in the Cuban Communist Party as a whole. Zhivkov’s report includes examples of Cuba’s self-criticism and Zhivkov’s own criticism of Cuba’s leadership. Some topics of discussion include: cultural and economic specialist exchanges, the price of sugar, Cuba’s increased collaboration with Soviet Union and other socialist nations, and economic subsidies and aid.

The report details Bulgaria’s preparations for a Cuban delegation and the visit itself. The author offers both praise and criticism of Cuban leadership. There has been positive progress in Cuba in recent years, yet underlying problems remain (e.g. the economy lacks planning). The Bulgarian government devised the visit as an opportunity to teach the Cuban delegation about building state socialism. The report includes an overview of the Cuban delegations visit. Discussions during the visit involved Cuban economic growth and barriers, China, Romania’s non-interventionist policies, Nixon’s 1972 visit to Moscow, and economic and scientific cooperation (particularly between Bulgaria and Cuba).

In a memorandum, Konstantin Tellalov, Head of the Foreign Policy and International Relations Department of the Central Committee of BCP, and Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev evaluate Cuban-Bulgarian relations. Tellalov and Bashev contextualize Cuba's development both nationally and internationally. Cuba's primary concerns are related to its economy (re: housing, rationing, embargo). Cuba's leadership continues to display a limited understanding of Marxism-Leninism, scientific planning (central planning), and the importance of COMECON. Taking into consideration the Bulgarian delegation’s recent visit to Cuba, they stress the importance of Cuba's success and the need for a radical, all-embracing commitment to relations.

The Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo report includes three main documents: a protocol and resolution with notes, a top secret information note, and a top secret protocol from 30 July 1970. The first section includes the Politburo's approval of the delegation's negotiations with Cuba, proposals to restructure economic partnership, and the Bulgarian delegation's statements on miscommunication between Cuba and Bulgaria. The second section, top secret information note, summarizes important exchanges during the Bulgarian visit to Cuba (e.g. Zhivkov's discussion on the importance of economic cooperation (COMECON) to the development of socialism). The third section, the top secret protocol, includes portions of a conversation between Bulgarian delegation and Cuban Politburo members. Castro summarizes ideas exchanged during the state visit.

Bulgarian Ambassador to Cuba Stefan Petrov analyzes Cuba’s domestic and foreign policies in an informational report to Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov. Petrov criticizes Cuban Communist Party policies and claims they are incompatible with Marxism-Leninism (e.g. Cuba’s focus on conflict between imperialism and national liberation rather than socialism and capitalism). Cuba has adopted an anti-Soviet attitude and believes Cuban leadership is the vanguard of communism. Petrov reviews Cuba’s conflicting relations with Latin American communist parties and Cuba's support to guerilla movements in the region. Petrov notes that Bulgarian-Cuban relations remain positive.

Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivan Bashev proposes a list of Bulgarian government officials to visit Cuba during an official state visit in early 1968.

In a memorandum to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo, Gero Grozev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, critiques the Cuban Communist Party and its approach to building socialism. Grozev describes Cuba’s increasingly poor relations with European communist parties, interference in Latin American affairs, and misunderstanding of Marxist-Leninist principles. Grozev continues describing Cuban leaders as committed functionaries unaware of their mistakes. To correct Cuba’s mistakes socialist countries should increase contact with the Cuban government and help it develop economically and mature politically.

Georgi Atanasov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, reviews the selection process for the 9th World Youth Festival host location. Cuba and Bulgaria both are candidates. Atanasov explains Cuba’s campaign and Bulgaria’s concern that strong support for its candidacy will sour its relations with Cuba. Atanasov contemplates problems with Cuba’s candidacy and ways to prevent a diplomatic disagreement.

Petar Marinkov, Third secretar at the Bulgarian Embassy to Cuba, informs the Bulgarian ambassador about meetings with Cuban officials on youth communist leagues. Marinkov’s reviews negotiations centered on Cuba’s non-participation in established youth leagues and festivals. Cuban youth leaders hope to host youth festivals and incorporate military training for armed liberation movements into youth festival activities.

In a coded telegram to the Central Committee of the German Unified Socialist Party, Dimo Dichev, Head of the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department of the BCP Central Committee, reports on Bulgaria’s military assistance to Cuba and national liberation movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.