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July 7, 1947

Letter, Office of the British Political Representative, Bucharest, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gh. Tatarescu

A message from the British Representative, Adrian Holman, addressed on July 7 to Minister Tatarescu as “personal and confidential." In five points, Holman essentially offer a rebuttal of Soviet criticisms to Marshall Plan.

July 4, 1947

Letter, Office of the British Political Representative, Bucharest, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gh. Tatarescu

A Romanian translation of the Letter of invitation sent by the Office of the British Political Representative in Bucharest

July 4, 1947

Letter, Office of the British Political Representative, Bucharest, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gh. Tatarescu

A letter of invitation sent by the Office of the British Political Representative in Bucharest, Adrian Holman, on behalf of both British and French Governments,addressed to the Romanian Government (via Foreign Minister Tatarescu) to participate to the Conference on ERP in Paris, on July 12, 1947.

September 6, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Thursday, 5 September 1991, 13:15 until 13:30 hours

Kohl and Gorbachev scrutinize the situation in the Soviet Union after the coup. They agree on the urgent need for more for financial help.

June 10, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with British Prime Minister Major on Sunday, 9 June 1991, in Chequers

Kohl and Major examine the state of European integration. Britain's position in the EC, the Political Union as well as the Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, they discuss the idea for the creation of a European policy force.

December 24, 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Discussion with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 December [1962]: 'Planning Requirements Resulting from the Nassau Pact and the JUPITER Decision'

JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy’s Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the “closely held decisions.” This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the “planning requirements” necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.

September 21, 1967

Memorandum from George Brown to Harold Wilson

When the USSR and the USA submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty in the early autumn of 1967, British representatives were enthusiastically arguing that as a prospective member of EURATOM, any British position must axiomatically take account of European interests.  As the negotiations moved forward, though, Wilson's government found itself caught in a three-sided trap of its own devising: fearful of being labelled “bad Europeans,” anxious about being seen by Washington as “unreliable allies,” and concerned about Moscow viewing them as part of the “treacherous West.”  Balancing out these competing concerns was becoming foremost in the minds of senior ministers.

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, Sir Burke Trend, and Sir Solly Zuckerman at 10:30a.m. on 1 March 1967]

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and Lord Chalfont at 6:50p.m. on 1 March 1967]

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

February 22, 1967

Non-Proliferation and Our Entry into E.E.C.

The Harold Wilson government was continually focused on the issue of demonstrating that Britain should be seen as a “European” power with interests compatible with the existing EEC membership. This high-level Foreign Office note queried what the UK could do when pulled in different directions by the need to finalize a non-proliferation treaty while avoiding unnecessary damage to its European interests. This memorandum was drafted against a background of rumblings from EEC capitals that by tacitly supporting NPT proposals put forward by U.S. officials the Wilson government was being anti-European.

Pagination