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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

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Soviet Union. Communist Party. Central Committee (CPSU CC). Politburo

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Soviet Union. Communist Party. Central Committee (CPSU CC)

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Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894 - 1971

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Andrei Gromyko at the UN, 1981

Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich

1909 - 1989

Nuclear Proliferation

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Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917 - 1963

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September 17, 1991	National Intelligence Daily for Tuesday, 17 September 1991 The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 17 September 1991 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union.
August 11, 1961	N. S. Khrushchev’s Comments on a Draft Declaration on Nuclear Tests Khrushchev explains the Soviet Union's decision to resume nuclear testing, attributing it to ongoing threats from Western powers and the lack of genuine progress on disarmament. He criticizes the US, Britain, and France for continuing nuclear tests and accuses them of using peaceful testing as a cover to improve their weapons. Emphasizing that true security can only come through complete disarmament, Khrushchev defends Soviet actions as necessary for national defense while reaffirming the USSR's broader commitment to global peace and disarmament.
December 8, 1959	Copy of a Note from N. S. Khrushchev to the CPSU CC Presidium about a Further Reduction of the USSR Armed Forces Nikita Khrushchev outlines a proposal to the CPSU CC Presidium for a significant reduction in the USSR's armed forces by 1 to 1.5 million personnel, even without reciprocal actions from other countries. He argues that the Soviet Union's advancements in missile technology and nuclear capabilities ensure its defense without the need for a large standing army, thereby enhancing economic efficiency and bolstering international prestige. Khrushchev emphasizes that such unilateral disarmament would reduce Cold War tensions, undermine militaristic factions globally, and improve the Soviet Union’s image as a proponent of peace. He suggests transitioning to a mixed system of professional and territorial (militia) forces to maintain readiness while lowering costs. The proposal aims to strengthen both domestic and international support for the USSR while showcasing the superiority of the socialist system. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
August 23, 1957	Record of a Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev with DRV President Ho Chi Minh in Crimea Ho Chi Minh reports on his trip to Europe, explains his impressions of various leaders in the Socialist bloc, and discusses Tito's politics in Yugoslavia with Khrushchev. They also discuss economic development and the Geneva Accords.
April 20, 1957	Record of a Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and the Ambassador of Japan, S. Kadowaki Khrushchev and Suemitsu Kadowaki talk about the recent restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. The Japanese Ambassador requests that Japanese POW's who would like to return home be permitted to do so, agrees with Khrushchev on the importance of safe fishing practices, and asks that the USSR stop testing nuclear weapons.
May 17, 1983	MAE DAP Memo on INF MAE DAP memo on resumption of negotiations on INF. Observations on Allied negotiating position regarding an intermediate solution. Discussion of the Soviet position (press conference by Foreign Minister Gromyko, statements by Secretary-General PCUS Andropov): The paper also discusses the issue of French and British national nuclear deterrents, deployment of Euro-missiles and Soviet SS-20, comments Allied countries and perspectives on the negotiations.
June 13, 1963	Annex to analysis by SMD on Proposal to assign to NATO Italian Polaris-armed Ships Report by Gen. A. Rossi on Polaris SLBM and NATO naval forces, including technological and employment features, costs. The report includes discussions of IRBM forces in Italy, and French and British nuclear forces.
June 13, 1960	Report on SHAPE meeting Analysis by the Head of the Italian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council (Alessandrini) of SHAPE meeting chaired by Gen. Norstad to examine Western/Soviet missile balance.
September 23, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Hays Redmon, Staff Assistant to the President, enclosing 'Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on Non-Proliferation' In this report, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summarizes Moscow's growing interest in reaching a final agreement on an NPT, in part because of its recognition of “pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities.”
July 9, 1965	State Department Policy Planning Staff, 'S/P Consultants Discussion of Atlantic Affairs' with Cover memorandum from Walt Rostow to Secretary of Defense McNamara In this meeting between members of the Policy Planning Staff's board of consultants, the participants discussed their policy preferences towards European nuclear arrangements. Recognizing “bitter” French and Soviet objections to a collective nuclear force, the consultants believed that over time it might be possible to “get both the force and the agreement.”