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Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) Clear All

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Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

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April 20, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 12582 to State Department, 'NPT—Duration,' partly garbled transmission A message from the Bonn embassy highlighted an issue that had been raised by West German diplomats and which Ambassador McGhee correctly believed represented thinking at the top: Chancellor Kiesinger’s objection to an NPT “of unlimited duration.”
April 12, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Norwegian Ambassador Arne Gunneng and ACDA Director Foster, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty' In this conversation, Director Foster and Norwegian Ambassador Gunneng discussed the state of the NPT negotiations and the U.S. consultations with West Germany. Foster made comments about Italy and West Germany being inflexible, and Gunneng stated that it would cost the country "a great deal internationally" if they continued to block progress.
April 7, 1967	US Embassy Paris Telegram 15735 to State Department, 'Vice President’s Visit: Meeting with General de Gaulle on April 7 – Nonproliferation Treaty' During his meeting with French president de Gaulle, Vice President Humphrey said that Washington knew the “French position” of opposition to the NPT, but wanted to know what de Gaulle thought the “German attitude” should be.
April 6, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 11806 to State Department, 'Vice President’s Visit III: Non-Proliferation Treaty' During this discussion with Vice President Humphrey, Kiesinger declared that the NPT was a “serious problem,” but said that he disagreed with some West German conservatives that it was “was not politically acceptable.” For Kiesinger, the problem was the Soviet Union, “which for years, and without any reason had attacked, slandered and threatened” West Germany.
March 27, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between Vice President Hubert Humphrey and ACDA Director Foster, 'Ambassador Foster’s Briefing of Vice President on NPT,' with enclosure, 'Questions Most Likely to be Asked on NPT' During this conversation, Director Foster briefed Vice President Humphrey about the progress of the NPT. Foster said that he was willing to meet Germany’s concerns about such issues as protecting its civil nuclear industry and a future European federation. Moreover, noting that Washington had to discuss the NPT with other countries that could “otherwise go nuclear,” Foster worried that a long delay caused by consultations could “jeopardize the chance of the rest of the world getting signed up.”
February 22, 1967	US Department of State, Oral Note, 'Interpretations Regarding Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Formulations' As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”
January 17, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn and Soviet Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Matters' Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”
January 13, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between ACDA Director William C. Foster and West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'Draft Articles of Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with draft treaty attached In this conversation, ACDA director Foster met with Ambassador Knappstein for an extended discussion of the NPT. Topics included the treaty’s compatibility with a future European federation, consultations by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the definition of a nuclear weapon, and the prohibition of national control over “peaceful nuclear explosives.”
December 29, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation with West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'German Concern Over Draft NPT Text' In this conversation, Ambassador Knappstein expressed concern over the draft of the NPT that Washington and Moscow had agreed on. Knappstein worried that the draft articles would foreclose “all of the available options for participation in nuclear defense."
November 28, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director ACDA, and Leonard S. Meeker, Legal Adviser to the Secretary, 'Revised Draft Language for a Non-Proliferation Treaty,' enclosing Memorandum for the President, 'Suggested Language for the Non-Proliferation Treaty' Further review on the proposed NPT by ACDA and State Department lawyers in this report concluded that the language would “not disturb existing bilateral relationships,” that is, arrangements to provide U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiled in NATO countries for the use of West German forces and other allies in the event of war.