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Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN)

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Sanders, Ben

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August 1, 2000	Thesis, US Joint Military Intelligence College, 'From Independence to the Bomb: India’s Nuclear Motivations, 1945-1974' This unclassified JMIC thesis focuses both on general motivations for nuclear proliferation as well as examining the specific case of India. Its chapters focus on key issues for nuclear motivations analysis; economic motivations for nuclear power, 1945-1964; India’s bid for nuclear self-reliance, 1962-1974; India’s nuclear motivations, and implications of India’s decisions.
November 1998	Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Z Division, 'Challenges of Advanced Nuclear Weapon Development in India' This heavily-redacted study is one of the few Z Division (International Assessments Program) documents that have been released. An unredacted portion (pp. 25-26) reports on the statements, labeled “inconsistent” by the author(s), of Indian nuclear scientists after the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests with regard to specific details of the devices tested.
April 15, 1994	Telegram, US Defense Intelligence Agency, 'South Africa: Nuclear Program in Turmoil' With the liquidation of South Africa’s weapons program, “disgruntled” scientists under threat of lay-off “threatened to reveal closely guarded secrets … unless they receive severance pay.”
November 1992	Defense Intelligence Assessment, US Defense Intelligence Agency, DST-1540Z-509-92-SI, 'Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets' This extract from a collection of DIA reports on national nuclear weapons programs, focuses on North Korea – which is discussed in the both the key judgments section as well as in a chapter which examines several aspects of the North Korean nuclear program. The chapter examines North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure, fuel cycle, the extent of foreign assistance, treaty obligations, the nuclear program and possible future developments, and delivery vehicles.
April 24, 1991	John T. Kriese, US Defense Intelligence Agency, 'Talking Points for Briefing to House Energy and Commerce Committee – Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' These talking points, prepared by John T. Kriese who at the time was both chief of the Nuclear Energy Division at DIA and chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Community, focused on the intelligence the US had available on the Iraqi nuclear program.
September 1985	Memorandum, US National Intelligence Council, NIC M 85-10001, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints' The most recent CREST release included this analysis of “The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints.” The analyst sought to explain why “no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred” since the Chinese nuclear test, India had not weaponized while Israel and South Africa had not “taken any action to signal overt possession of nuclear weapons.”
February 1980	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Project Division, 'Proliferation Analysis and International Assessments' This issue of Proliferation Analysis and International Assessments includes a heavily excised article on Iraq, a piece on South Africa’s security prospects, and a apparently a third essay that has been wholly exempted. The essay on South Africa’s nuclear aims suggests that the arguments pro and con for a nuclear capability to deal with regional security threats are so powerful that “internal political and bureaucratic” consideration are probably more relevant for nuclear decisions.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.
November 26, 1979	International Technology Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory, ITO-79-155, '22 September 1979 Event Report Draft' This Los Alamos study is another in the series of report and studies of the Vela event performed by US intelligence agencies, the national labs, and contractors.

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Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) 61

United States. Department of State 61

Sanders, Ben 53

United States. Central Intelligence Agency 35

Soviet Union. Communist Party. Central Committee (CPSU CC). Politburo 30

United States 617

Soviet Union 437

Indian Nuclear History 226

Nuclear Proliferation 212

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 164

Pakistani Nuclear History 147

Israeli Nuclear History 123