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April 12, 2017

Oral History Interview with Nabil Fahmy

The interview with Nabil Fahmy provides an in-depth view of Egypt’s position and strategies during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Fahmy emphasizes Egypt's focus on addressing regional asymmetries, particularly Israel's nuclear ambiguity, while advocating for global disarmament and non-proliferation. He reflects on Egypt's frustrations with unfulfilled promises from the U.S. and Israel, including failed bilateral and multilateral talks like ACRS, which underpinned Egypt’s skepticism toward the indefinite extension of the NPT. Despite knowing that indefinite extension was inevitable, Egypt used the Middle East resolution as leverage, securing its inclusion as part of the final package. Fahmy underscores Egypt's practical yet principled stance, acknowledging the challenges of disarmament and the limits of what could realistically be achieved given the prevailing geopolitical dynamics.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

July 11, 1966

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to the Secretary of State, 'Comments on the Proposed Revision of the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with enclosures

In this memorandum, McNamara, Rusk, and Adrian Fisher discuss amendments and language of the NPT treaty that was in stalemate that summer. Fisher saw the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, with its prohibition of the “transfer of atomic weapons to any other country,” as providing model language for an NPT because it was compatible with the bilateral agreements.

April 28, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate 23-66, 'West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons,' excised copy

This NIE estimated that within two years Bonn could produce enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon, but only by violating safeguards on its nuclear facilities.The estimators, nevertheless, believed that Bonn “will probably want to keep open what options it has for the eventual production of nuclear weapons.”

June 11, 1963

A.A. Wells, Director of Office of International Affairs, AEC, to Dr. Ragnar Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, 'Reported Franco-German Cooperation in Development of the French Gaseous Diffusion Efforts'

In this memorandum, Wells reported on comments that West German Minister for Scientific Research Hans Lenz made during a meeting at the Atomic Energy Convention. Noting that West Germany had been holding talks with the French and EURATOM about building a reprocessing plant at Karlsruhe, Lenz “implied that this proposal quite likely had resulted in reports that Germany might be undertaking a cooperative program with France in the development of their gaseous diffusion plant at Pierrelatte.” Lenz then reaffirmed West Germany's commitment to the 1955 Brussels Treaty pledge, declaring that West Germany would not initiate action to develop military applications of atomic energy.

May 21, 1963

Atomic Energy Commission, 'German Participation in Pierrelatte Gaseous Diffusion Plant,' with Cover Memo from Myron B. Kratzer, Division of International Affairs, to Mr. Thomas and Mr. Kaufman, Department of State

This AEC report looked at the Pierrelatte plant’s prospective capabilities, possible West German motives for seeking an independent supply of enriched uranium (possibly in cooperation with the French), the “adverse” implications of a French-German project, and policy alternatives available to Washington. If the West Germans were determined to contribute to the French enrichment project, the AEC saw serious risks including the “the prospects of a Franco-German military alliance that could constitute a European third force capable of dominating Western Europe."

May 13, 1963

Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg to President Kennedy, with Attachment 'Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Project'

In this report, the CIA and the AEC found that because the French underestimated the cost of the Pierrelatte plant, they had a reason to consider West German financial aid.They conclude that the West Germans had relevant technical skill and the French may have regarded cooperation as a tactic to dodge Adenauer’s 1954 commitment and also as a “way for German industry to improve its position in the nuclear technological race.”

May 7, 1963

National Security Action Memorandum 241, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant' with Attachment 'France'

A report about an alleged French request to West Germany for financial support for their Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant raised White House hackles, despite German and French disavowals. In this memorandum, McGeorge Bundy asked the CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] to investigate the report and the State Department to develop policy recommendations in light of the findings.

January 23, 1963

US Embassy West Germany Airgram A-1566, 'Franco-German Cooperation in Nuclear Field'

In a follow up report to an airgram from December 28, 1962, the U.S. embassy in Bonn determined that the French and the Germans were considering building a reprocessing plant at the Karlsruhe nuclear complex.

December 28, 1962

US Embassy West Germany Airgram A-1389, 'Franco-German Cooperation in Atomic Energy Matters'

This report from the American embassy in Bon to the Department of State details the embassy's impressions that cooperation between France and Germany in the atomic energy field was underway.

April 4, 2018

Oral History Interview with Jean duPreez

Member of South Africa’s delegation to the 1995 NPT review conference.

Pagination