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December 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537

The document describes how the North Koreans enthusiastically celebrated the consensus of Committee No. 1 over the Korean issue in the UN; however, Lazar believes that the Korean leadership has not actually grasped the full implications of the decision. In addition, the telegram describes how Pyongyang's attempt to reassert control over South Korean islands close to the North Korean shores in the Yellow Sea has created friction between the two countries. The author also mentions that North Korean support for the student movements in South Korea legitimized Seoul's harsher crackdown on the dissident movements.

June 17, 1953

Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov in Berlin to N.A. Bulganin, 11:00 p.m.

The demonstrations in Berlin and several other cities had been stopped. Grechko and Tarasow came to the conclusion that "the provocation was prepared in advance, organized, and directed from Western sectors of Berlin." The losses of the strikers in the whole territory of the GDR had been: 84 people killed and wounded, 700 men arrested.

June 18, 1953

Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov to N.A. Bulganin, 2:30 p.m.

The authors state that Berlin was calm, but there were a few demonstrations in some smaller GDR cities. The authors referred to military intelligence information according to which the US 7th Army and the 12th Air Force Army were put on alert in the US zone at 5.30 a.m. on June 18. But the alert state for the 7th Army was canceled after three hours.

September 8, 1953

Radio Free Europe Report on the Strikes in Plzen during Early June 1953

Account of a 31-year-old locksmith who took part in the protests in Plzen.

May 18, 1961

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Soviet Newspapers’ Comments on the South Korean Military Coup'

According to Chinese analysis, the Soviet press described the Park Chung Hee coup in South Korea as reactionary and led by the United States.

May 21, 1961

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Contents of the May 18th North Korean Party Central Standing Committee Meeting'

A Chinese report on a Meeting of the Central Standing Committee in which the North Koreans negatively reflected on the Park Chung Hee coup in South Korea.

June 2007

Around the Nomination (The Case of Orlov). Folder 42. The Chekist Anthology

In this folder Mitrokhin expresses the KGB’s concerns regarding the potential for Yuri Orlov’s nomination for a Nobel Prize. Orlov was well known in the Soviet Union for his dissident activities and for organizing the Moscow Helsinki Group to monitor Soviet adherence to the 1975 Helsinki Accords. According to Mitrokhin, he openly supported all anti-soviet groups and organized public protests for the Soviet human rights movement. As the KGB was concerned, they made many efforts to take the movement under control, but these did not lead to success. Mitrokhin provides examples of the KGB’s attempts to stop Orlov’s activism.

Mitrokhin states that the West, however, was in extreme support of Orlov’s ideology. In order to help his movement to gain more influence, Western officials nominated Orlov for the Nobel Prize in 1978. The KGB immediately developed a complex plan to assure Nobel officials that Orlov did not deserve the prize and that it would have been unfavorable for the prestige of the Nobel Prize if Orlov was awarded it. Mitrokhin states that KGB chief Yuri Andropov took control over the operation because Orlov winning the prize would have been crucially harmful for the Soviet political system. Mitrokhin provides the detailed plan in this entry.

A KGB resident in Oslo sent an urgent telegram to Moscow on October 27, 1978 stating that Anwar El Sadat and Menachem Begin became laureates of the Nobel Peace prize. Mitrokhin provides full telegram text in this entry and also states that the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his satisfaction with the fact that Orlov did not win the prize because it would have negatively affected relations between the two countries.

July 1, 1953

Telephonogram from Miroshnichenko and Lunkov to Semenov, [early July 1953]

On 17 June, the Soviet military had stopped all cross-sector travel, causing widespread resentment among many East Germans who worked in the Western sectors or crossed them on their way to work. Under pressure from the East German population in the days following the uprising, SED leaders and local Soviet High Commission officials urged Semenov, then in Moscow for the Extraordinary CPSU Plenum, to normalize the traffic situation in Berlin. Semenov, following Molotov’s orders, informed Ulbricht that the question of free movement across the sector border “must be decided by the [German] comrades themselves, taking the situation into account.” On 7 July, tram and metro traffic between the sectors in Berlin was restored.

June 2, 1953

Cable from Major General Wilton B. Persons to Col. Robert L. Schulz Explaining the Department of State’s Views on the New Course

The U.S. state department comments on East German announcement to ease government policies following the East German Uprising. They believe the Soviet Union intends to compromise with Western powers on Germany before the rearmament of the Federal Republic through the European Defense Community plan.

July 4, 1953

Telephonogram from Miroshnichenko and Lun’kov to Soviet High Commissioner V. Semyonov Regarding Inter-zone Travel

Telegram describing discontent of the German population living in East Berlin at the disruption caused by the restrictions imposed on intra-zones travel as a result of the events of 17 June 1953. The telegram recommends actions to be taken to improve the movement of people across the Berlin border.

Pagination