Skip to content

Results:

141 - 150 of 174

Documents

May 29, 1961

Memorandum from Deputy Chair, South African Atomic Energy Board, T. E. W. Schumann Regarding 2 June 1961 Paris Meeting on Bilateral Safeguards

Memorandum discussing the impact on South Africa of new safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the sale and transfer of nuclear materials.

July 21, 1960

Letter from South African Department for Foreign Affairs Official M.I. Botha on Sale of Uranium to Israel (excerpt)

July 20, 1960

Letter from South African Ambassador A.G. Dunn to South African Department for Foreign Affairs Official M.I. Botha on the Sale of Uranium to Israel

South African Ambassador to the United States A.G. Dunn states that the United States would not approve of South Africa selling uranium to Israel even if the contract specified that they would obey IAEA safeguards once they were implemented worldwide.

July 19, 1960

Confidential Telegram from South African Ambassador in Vienna D.B. Sole to South African Department of Foreign Affairs Official M.I. Botha on sale of Uranium to Israel.

The South African Ambassador in Vienna Donald B. Sole responds to a message concerning the Israeli interest in purchasing uranium from South Africa. He does not think that the Israeli Minister's statement that Israeli would obey IAEA safeguards "should be taken seriously" and thus he does not believe it would be in South Africa's best interest to complete the sale.

July 7, 1960

Confidential Telegram from South African Department of Foreign Affairs M. I. Botha to South African Ambassador to Vienna D.B. Sole on sale of Uranium to Israel

December 15, 1995

Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

June 28, 1967

Meeting Minutes, 'Points of Interest arising from Uranium Marketing Committee Meeting: June 26, 1967'

Notes the current negotiations of the major nuclear powers from a meeting of the South African Uranium Marketing Committee.

September 1957

Letter, South African Charge d’Affaires in Vienna, 'South African Developments in the Atomic Energy Field'

E.G. Fourie of the South African Department for Foreign Affairs writes to Charge d’Affaires Donald Sole about recent developments in the South African nuclear problem. He informs Sole that earlier that year the Government of Iran, through the British Embassy in Tehran, requested that Iranian engineers be sent to South Africa for training in uranium prospecting and extradition.

April 28, 1960

Letter, South African Ambassador to the United States, 'Enriched Uranium and Plutonium from the US Atomic Energy Commission'

Letter from the Ambassador to the United States discussing problems with a prior South African request for nuclear material from the Atomic Energy Commission.

February 26, 1960

S.A. Levin, D. E. Hatch, and E. Von Halle, 'Production of Enriched Uranium for Nuclear Weapons by Nations X, Y, and Z by Means of the Gas Centrifuge Process,' Operations Analysis Division, Union Carbide Nuclear Company

A Union Carbide Nuclear Company study to determine how quickly and easily foreign countries could develop and utilize gas centrifuges with the goal of creating nuclear weapon facilities. The study determines that, due to the cheap cost and relatively small size of the centrifuges, even un-industrialized countries such as Cuba could achieve this technology within 8 years if helped by a larger nation.

Pagination