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December 13, 1995

Email, ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n’ Stomp, 'India Update – 19951213'

Email from ITAIN Division to South Asian Romp n' Stomp regarding the state of cables at an Indian nuclear facility. According to this message, the cable at the test site had changed its shape again, from a thick cable to two smaller connected cables. The “Stemming pile” is a reference to the mound of dirt that would cover the test device once it had been placed in the hole. The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown, as it the jokey reference to “South Asian Romp n’ Stomp.”

December 12, 1995

Email, ITAIN Division Reports to Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CTB, Nuke, 'Indian Nuclear Update'

Email from ITAIN Division to Reports to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regarding the state of India's nuclear reactors. Directed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the message provides a glimmer of the intelligence watch over the Indian nuclear test site. At least two sites were under observation, one where the mysterious cables had been rearranged, and the other where there was much “personnel activity.” The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown.

December 11, 1995

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Memorandum by Robert S. Rochlin, 'Implications of an Indian Nuclear Weapons Test'

Memo from senior scientist at the ACDA, Robert S. Rochlin, discussing the possible serious political and diplomatic consequences of India launching a nuclear test. In the event that Rao had made a decision to test, the United States did not have enough “leverage” to encourage a policy reversal or to prevent a regional arms race; Washington would need to organize a “concerted intervention by all the major states.”

December 11, 1995

State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials'

Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

December 10, 1995

State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'

Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

February 10, 1960

Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 10 February 1960

Kim Il reports on food and oil supplies from the Soviet Union, the introduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea, and suggest concluding a treaty of alliance, friendship and mutual aid between the USSR and the DPRK.

February 15, 1963

Bulgarian Legation, Washington (Shterev), Cable to Foreign Ministry

Bulgarian Charge d’Affaires in the US Kiril Shterev reports to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that US Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric stated that three submarines carrying Polaris missiles will be deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. The deployment follows US withdrawal from Italian and Turkish bases after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

January 28, 1963

Bulgarian Consulate, Istanbul (Karadimov), Cable to Foreign Ministry

Bulgarian General Consul in Istanbul Dimo Karadimov reports to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry news of new ballistic missiles in Turkey. Specifically, Karadimov notes that the US military will replace Jupiter missiles with Polaris missiles within the year. Karadimov cannot confirm NATO's involvement.

December 27, 1962

Bulgarian UN Representative Milko Tarabanov, Report to Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo on Disarmament Negotiations

UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session.

The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO).

Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

November 23, 1976

United States Information Service, 'United States Statement on UN Vote on South Africa'

US statement to the UN General Assembly delivered by delegate Father Hupp. The statement explains the why the US voted no on a series of resolutions regarding South Africa. These included resolutions on an arms embargo, sporting boycott and other resolutions concerning Apartheid. It also voted no on a resolution condemning Israel for arms sales to South Africa.

Pagination