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Results:

1541 - 1550 of 1936

Documents

August 24, 1984

Deputy Minister Markus Wolf, Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Experts on the RYAN Problem, 14 to 18 August 1984

Memorandum summarizing consultations between the Stasi and KGB over RYAN (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, or “nuclear weapon attack”), an intelligence program initiated by the KGB to collect indicators of a potential nuclear first-strike by the US. The KGB had developed a new system for the early detection of war preparations for a first-strike attack, which should provide evidence of such preparations on the basis of “objective” indicators that would be hard to manipulate.

December 2, 1964

Stasi Report on Meetings with the KGB, 30 November-1 December 1964

Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson's recent election in the United States, Khrushchev's ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

October 25, 1962

Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 25 October 1962

Boissevain relates the Cuban response to the crisis. In a speech, Castro does not deny the placement of nuclear weapons, and claims this kind of denial has been heard more from Khrushchev. The impression is one of building missile silos which look like "ground-to-ground" launch sites from the air. The Cuban government is satisfied with the developments from the UN Security Council regarding the issue, as evidenced by the Havana airport being reopened for international flights.

November 2, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, New York

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.

October 29, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations

Brazilian President João Goulart emphasizes that the possibility of an adequate solution (to the Cuban Missile Crisis) could be increased if there were measures to suspend the quarantine (blockade) immediately, followed by corresponding and effective stoppage of weapons shipment to Cuba as well as determining obligations to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons and the installation of bases. In his opinion the danger of war could increase significantly and worries of Brazil would grow as far as its own security was concerned, if such bases were installed in Cuba or any other part of LA. He also brought to the attention the proposal of Brazil in the UN for the denuclearization of Latin America.

November 25, 1991

Memo, US Proposals Concerning Limited Non-Nuclear Space Defense and Missile Attack Warning System

Memo on Soviet-American consultations in Washington between November 25 and 27, 1991. The American side proposed discussion of limited non-nuclear missile defense and early warning systems, but the Soviet side refused to be drawn into lengthy discussions. The US also rejected the Soviet proposal to create joint missile attack warning systems.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.

1988

Memo, Concerning Draft Agreement About the Observance of the ABM Treaty and Non-Withdrawal Period

Memo describing Geneva negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The two sides disagreed on the restrictions of the non-withdrawal period and the testing of ABM components or sensors in space.

December 8, 1986

Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee Resolution, on the Expiration of the Soviet Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Draft resolution with instructions for announcing the expiration of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing on 1 January 1987.

December 8, 1986

Proposal on the Expiration of the Unilaterial Soviet Moratorium on Nuclear Testing

Proposal to resume Soviet nuclear testing following the expiration of the USSR's unilateral moratorium on nuclear detonations on 1 January 1987. The US government continued nuclear testing throughout 1986 and did not join the Soviet moratorium. Proposes to announce the resumption of testing in December 1986 following the first American test explosion in 1987.

Pagination