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1561 - 1570 of 1936

Documents

October 31, 1962

Air Letter from Mexican Embassy, Rio de Janeiro

An air letter from Mexican Embassy describing Brazil's role as the mediator of the Cuban crisis, the dismantling of Cuban nuclear weapons bases, and the role of the UN in this conflict.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from Mexican Embassy, Santo Domingo

A telegram from the Mexican Embassy outlining that the Government of Cuba has turned a dangerous situation into, in their eyes, a peaceful one by allowing an aggressive Russian base with nuclear weapons in Cuba, as well as by measures for public force to suppress possible disorders.

September 30, 1981

Memorandum of Conversation, Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro and US Secretary of State Haig

Brazilian Foreign Minister Guerreiro and American Secretary of State Alexander Haig meet in Washington D.C. Haig illustrates a shift in American nuclear policy from that of the Carter administration to a more lenient approach.

February 25, 1977

Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel, US Threats and Promises and Brazilian Responses

This memo outlines “possible American approaches” and “possible Brazilian reactions” as the US attempts to compel the Brazilians and Germans to cease their nuclear cooperation.

October 30, 1962

Minutes of Conversation between the Delegations of the CPCz and the CPSU, The Kremlin (excerpt)

In this conversation between Khrushchev and Novotny, Khrushchev used exceptionally candid language to defend his handling of the superpower confrontation, what he described as “six days which shook the world.” While well aware that many fellow communists (including the Chinese and Cubans) regarded his agreement under pressure from US President John F. Kennedy to remove the missiles as a surrender to the imperialists, Khrushchev stoutly defended his action as not only a necessary measure to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, but actually a victory. Khrushchev bluntly criticized Fidel Castro for failing to comprehend the true nature of war in the thermonuclear age and, that at the height of the crisis, he had suggested in a letter to Khrushchev that the Soviets should be the first to use nuclear weapons, striking the United States should it attack Cuba, even though this would lead promptly to a global war.

March 21, 1977

Brazilian Embassy Cable, Brazilian Ambassador to Bonn Reports on Soviet Pressure on West Germany

The Brazilian Ambassador in Bonn reports on a Der Spiegel article, which states, “After the United States, it is now the Soviet Union’s turn to exert pressure for Bonn to revise its controversial atomic agreement with Brazil.” The article shows US-Soviet solidarity against Brazil and Germany’s cooperation in developing nuclear weapons.

January 31, 1977

Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel on Jimmy Carter’s “Radical” Nuclear Stance

Brazilian Minister of State for External Relations, Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira, comments on the recently elected Carter administration’s nuclear politics. Silveira’s message to President Geisel displays Brazilian frustration over American interference in its nuclear program and relations with Germany.

November 19, 1976

US Embassy Cable, Brazilian Public Reaction to US Nuclear Policies

The US Embassy in Brazil quotes a Brazilian ministry official who declares Brazil will continue its nuclear program “despite all the threats and reprisals” from the US. The unnamed official goes on to say, “The Americans, our allies, are behaving in a way worse than that of our common enemies, the Russians.”

1975

Cables between the Brazilian Embassy in Washington and the Brazilian Foreign Ministry on the Transfer of Nuclear Material

A series of correspondence between Brazilian Foreign Ministry and Brazilian Ambassador to the US about the transfer of nuclear material from France to Brazil. Myron Kratzer, Acting Assistant Secretary for Scientific Affairs in the US, expressed his concern over the fact the nuclear material was of American origin.

May 23, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202 on Nuclear Proliferation

Following India’s nuclear weapon test, the US must reassess its nuclear non-proliferation policy and how best to deal with India in the future. The author of the memo determines that nuclear non-proliferation is still necessary and can be “effectively pursued.” The memo is followed by a series of documents outlining courses of action to help deter further proliferation.

Pagination