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Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN)

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Sanders, Ben

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1983	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.
November 26, 1982	Secretary of State George Schultz to President Reagan, 'How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to Protect Our Strategic Interests in the Face of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Activities' Secretary of State George Shultz’s letter to President Reagan covering the history of US responses to Pakistan’s nuclear program and future courses of action by the United States. While each option will rescind United States’ aid money, the Secretary details three different ways to go about it, with varying political implications for each.
1980	Military Exercise Report of the Decision of the Commander of the Maritime Front for an Offensive Operation A note to the Chief of Staff of the GDR People's Navy, this document assesses the enemy position and military capabilities in the Baltic Sea, the Jutland Peninsula, and the North Sea. The document notes that the NATO forces are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The stated objective of the exercise is to remove the enemy's nuclear weapons capabilities, to defeat enemy forces defending the Jutland Peninsula, and thereby to create conditions under which Warsaw Pact forces may then reach the North Sea.
September 6, 1976	Military Exercise Tarcza-76 Instruction No. 1 of the Northern Front for Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction This document describes a Warsaw Pact military exercise. The document describes the enemy's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons.
October 25, 1982	State Department Cable 299499 to US Embassy Islamabad, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia' In a follow-up message after his trip to Islamabad, Ambassador General Vernon Walters noted that at the end of the conversation with Zia the Pakistani President had given his “word of honor” that Pakistan “will not develop a nuclear device or a weapon.”
October 17, 1982	US Embassy Pakistan Cable 15696 to State Department, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia' The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports to the State Department on a meeting between Ambassador General Vernon Walters and President Zia. Walters returned to Islamabad to warn Pakistani officials that U.S. aid was in “grave jeopardy” after a link between the Pakistani program and Chinese technology was discovered. A U.S. military aid package, which included F-16 fighter-bombers, was also discussed.
July 6, 1982	US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10276 to State Department, 'My Final Meeting with President Zia' After Ambassador General Vernon Walters’ second day meeting with President Zia, the Pakistani leader verbally acknowledged U.S. evidence that Pakistan sought nuclear weapons components from abroad despite promises not to do so. However, Zia refused to put this in writing, and in a letter to President Reagan claimed the U.S. intelligence was a “total fabrication,” likely in an effort to save face.
July 5, 1982	US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10239 to State Department, 'My First Meeting with President Zia' A report to the State Department from Ambassador General Vernon Walters on his meeting with President Zia, where he confronted the Pakistani President with “incontrovertible evidence” that his country had “transferred designs and specifications for nuclear weapons components to purchasing agents in several countries for the purpose of having these nuclear weapons components fabricated for Pakistan” despite promises not to do so. Zia denied the charge, and Walter later commented, “either he really does not know or is the most superb and patriotic liar I have ever met.”
June 17, 1982	Terry Jones, Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy, Dept of State, to J. Devine et al., enclosing summaries of State Dept cable traffic during 1981-1982 relating to demarches on attempted purchase of sensitive nuclear-related products A summary of U.S. State Department cable traffic regarding Pakistan’s nuclear efforts in 1981-1982. While the Reagan administration was inclined to give Pakistan some leeway in light of their support for anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology from abroad was still something that the administration was against. Evidence that Pakistan had made efforts, some successful, to acquire specific technology that suggested a nuclear test was being prepared raised a red flag in the U.S. government
June 4, 1982	Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program' A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.

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Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) 61

United States. Department of State 61

Sanders, Ben 53

United States. Central Intelligence Agency 35

Soviet Union. Communist Party. Central Committee (CPSU CC). Politburo 30

United States 617

Soviet Union 437

Indian Nuclear History 226

Nuclear Proliferation 212

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 164

Pakistani Nuclear History 147

Israeli Nuclear History 123