The Soviet KGB and Czechoslovak Interior Ministry agree to the exchange of workers between the two countries. These exchanges would focus on the sharing of information and expertise in various areas, including: identification procedures for unidentified bodies, security measures for capital regions, fire-fighting methods and ways to combat subversive activity in youth and teenagers. The two parties also agree to the exchange of publications on the Soviet military, security and criminology, which are listed by title and number of copies.

The two parties set forth their joint security strategy to manage perceived threats to state authority from the summer of 1978 through 1980. They agree to work with broadcast stations, including Radio Free Europe, to ensure they are not subversive stations and to use Czechoslovak students as agents against subversive radio stations. The parties highlight the importance of fighting Zionist and Trotskyist organizations, and make plans to cooperate to infiltrate organizations, including Jewish religious groups, that may have been infiltrated by these organizations. KGB and Czechoslovak security officials pledge to cooperate in monitoring and infiltrating international communist groups and reactionary church groups, including some associated with the Vatican, in order to detect and foil potential upcoming actions against the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries. Foreign religious groups active in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventists, are mentioned as potentially anti-state. Both parties agree to cooperate in order to frustrate attempts by anti-socialist parties in Czechoslovak to connect with anti-state dissidents in the Soviet Union and share information on new forms of fighting actions of anti-socialist individuals. To combat ideological diversion, the parties decide to promote scientific and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The Soviet and Czechoslovak delegates decide to implement counter-intelligence and anti-ideological diversion measures at prominent international events such as the 1980 Summer (Moscow) and Winter (Lake Placid) Olympic Games and international film festivals, exhibitions and fairs to be held in the Soviet Union. Both parties agree to monitor extremist and terrorist groups, youth organizations in East Germany, France, England and the United States and Kurdish students studying in Europe.

This report summarizes extended cooperation measures undertaken by representatives of the Czechoslovak and Soviet security agencies. Methods to increase cooperation include the exchange of operational and scientific technology and enhanced coordination between operational agencies to combat espionage and ideological diversion.

The two schools agree to bilateral consultations regarding training content and internships for cadets and to share teaching materials, teachers, recorded lectures and film. Both educational institutions pledge to work together to determine a common plan for each school year. This agreement also mentions the Soviet Red Banner distinction.

Mitrokhin states that discipline was the main reason for assigning a pseudonym to a KGB agent. Some agents refused to choose a pseudonym, considering it to be humiliating. But as Mitrokhin points out, a refusal to use a pseudonym could diminish the psychological and operational effect of the recruitment process. The KGB Order No. 00430 stipulated that all recruits had to sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding their collaboration with the agency. The KGB Order No. 00235 specified that the most valuable agents had to be indexed solely by their respective pseudonyms. As a recruitment tactic, Mitrokhin notes, the use of a pseudonym enhanced agent’s awareness of the secretive nature of one’s work and accentuated the conspiratorial function of the KGB.

The Memorandum No. 153/838 considered problems associated with the dissident movement of the Peoples Workers’ Union (Narodno-trudovoy soyuz, NTS). Vasili Mitrokhin writes that among the primary concerns mentioned in the Memorandum was the execution of complex active measures to aggravate contradictions between the leadership of various NTS groups.

The Memorandum instructed operatives to observe relations of the NTS with the publishers of the journal “Continent.” In order to fuel up tensions between the NTS groups, operatives needed to, among other things, find out whether members of the “Continent” received higher payments than members of the NTS. In general, Mitrokhin suggests that the foremost purpose of the Memorandum was to gather disreputable information and undermine activities of the NTS.

Vasili Mitrokhin describes investigative methods used during anti-Soviet incidents in Sverdlovsk and Serov. On November 7, 1969 anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed in the city of Sverdlovsk. The KGB collected 60 copies. It was determined that the leaflets were made on a portable typewriter of a foreign make using a standard-format paper. It was also estimated based on the content of the leaflets that the author was approximately 17-20 years old. On April 26, 1970 the anonymous leaflets appeared in the city for the second time. They were printed on the same typewriter, but differed in content. The KGB operatives collected 14 copies. Similarly to the first group of leaflets, they feature a signature of the “Executive body of the party ‘Free Russia’.”

On May 1, 1970 identical leaflets were disseminated in the city of Serov. The KGB operatives narrowed down the circle of suspects to 176 students. From local testimonies, they discovered that Uzlov, a student at the Ural Institute of Engineers, had been a member of a youth organization called “Revolutionary Workers’ Party,” which was later renamed to “Free Russia.” Nikolay Shaburov (born 1945) and Victor Pestov (born 1946) were leaders of the “Free Russia.” They designed the text of the leaflets and recruited followers to help distribute the copies. Members of the “Free Russia” were arrested and convicted.

Annual review presented by V.V. Fedorchuk, chairman of the KGB in the Ukrainian SSR, summarizes the main successes, failures, and future priorities of the KGB in 1971.

Mitrokhin observes that having surveyed Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, codenamed “Pauk” (Spider), for a long time, the KGB had sufficient evidence to prosecute him. However, their intention was to debunk his teachings. The KGB Directorate of Ryazan Oblast invited agent “Marina”—Natalia Reshetovskaya— to participate in their actions against Solzhenitsyn. Mitrokhin indicates that Marina went through an intensive course of operative and psychological preparation. The KGB familiarized her with the nature of ideological subversion practiced by security services dealing with Solzhenitsyn. Marina also gained necessary expertise by performing practical tasks, learning the surroundings of Solzhenitsyn, and taking a look at his literary works.

Beyond Solzhenitsyn, the KGB Directorate of Ryazan Oblast also oversaw various clubs and organizations attended by intelligentsia that might have had harmful political inclinations. There were several instances of such developments recorded in Ryazan Oblast. In 1967, Belik, teacher at a music school in Ryazan, founded the Olymp Society, whose policy was to combat government censorship. Bigalko, teacher of Russian language at the Pedagogical Institute, started a discussion club called “Disk” that encouraged students to think critically and challenge authority. The KGB Directorate of Ryazan Oblast compiled reports on teachers and representatives of intelligentsia who held anti-Soviet views. Professor Vilensky was one of them. He urged the introduction of another political party, listened to foreign radio programs, and drew comparisons between the Soviet and bourgeois ways of life. Such behavior contributed to an atmosphere of impunity among citizenry, which further encouraged unwanted generalizations.

This folder contains information about KGB active measures directed at author Alexander Solzhenitsyn following his exile from the Soviet Union in 1974. The operational directives prepared by the KGB’s leadership for 1974 and 1975 are reproduced verbatim. They included plans to limit Solzhenitsyn’s influence in the West, discredit him and the pro-democracy literary journal “Continent” with which he was closely associated, and make his family fear for their personal safety.

Many of the specific measures undertaken by the KGB are described in the document. These included televised interviews with men featured in “The Gulag Archipelago” in which they claimed that Solzhenitsyn fabricated or misrepresented their statements to him, the publication of personal letters between Solzhenitsyn and his close male friends which were intended to reveal the “intimacy of their relations,” and the publication of an article claiming that Solzhenitsyn failed to pay his taxes while he resided in Switzerland. The 1978 operation codenamed “Vampire 1” involved planting a news story which suggested that Solzhenitsyn was a KGB spy, and having it reprinted in prominent newspapers and journals throughout Europe and the US. The document concludes with an index of acronyms, people, and codenames mentioned in the folder.