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Intelligence Operations in the Cold War

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

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Eastern Europe

Czechoslovakia

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Eastern Europe

Bulgaria

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Eastern Europe

The Palace of the Republic (Palast der Republik) in Berlin

Eastern Europe

East Germany

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Soviet Union. Committee for State Security (KGB)

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Project RYaN

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański broadcasting for Radio Free Europe, 3 May 1952

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Todor Zhivkov Collection

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Mitrokhin, Vasili

1922 - 2004

Mitrokhin Archive

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Kalatozov, Mikhail

1903 - 1973

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Germany (East). Ministry for State Security (Stasi)

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Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich

1914 - 1984

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Bulgaria. Ministry of Internal Affairs

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Truman with Attlee and Stalin at Potsdam

Cold War Origins

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Documents

December 11, 1953	National Security Council, NSC 174, Draft 'United States Policy Toward The Soviet Satellites In Eastern Europe' This report by the National Security Council discusses Soviet control over Eastern Europe, barriers to Soviet control of the satellites, and the power threat that consolidation poses to the United States. As a result, the NSC recommends that United States pursue a policy of resistance towards Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites, and should impose pressure and propaganda to weaken Soviet influence.
November 7, 1967	Complaint by [Government of] Brazil Regarding Czechoslovak Transport of Guerrilla Fighters from Cuba to Latin America Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.
November 17, 1967	Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.
June 2007	Coordination of Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence Operations. Folder 80. The Chekist Anthology. This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.
July 10, 1953	CIA Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly This CIA report contains a chronological breakdown of the nature and extent of the riots and demonstrations in East Germany, and descriptions of the Soviet reaction, East German capabilities, East German government reaction, and the Soviet policy reaction. According to the report, at this point, the USSR has not yet revealed any long-term policy reaction to the German situation.
July 21, 1953	Intelligence Advisory Committee, Special Estimate (SE-47), 'Probable Effect Of Recent Developments In Eastern Germany On Soviet Policy With Respect To Germany' This intelligence report presents and analyzes Soviet policy in East Germany before, during, and after the East German Uprising. The report assesses potential actions the Soviets could take in the future towards East Germany, and the likelihood of each.
October 4, 1989	East German Ministry of State Security, 'Nuclear, Chemical, and Ballistic Missile Potential of Selected Threshold Countries' (excerpt) Iraq's WMD capacity as of October 1989 from Stasi Perspective
December 16, 1982	East German Ministry of State Security, 'US and NATO Military Planning on Mission of V Corps/US Army During Crises and in Wartime,' (excerpt) The Stasi's own preface to the V Corps/U.S. Army 1981 war plan (which recognizes that NATO's concept was defensive in nature in contrast to Warsaw Pact plans, which until 1987 indeed envisioned the mentioned "breakthrough towards the Rhine")
December 16, 1985	East German Ministry of State Security, 'Assessment of Adversary’s Intelligence on Development of Warsaw Pact Forces, 1983-1985' (excerpt) The Stasi preface on NATO intelligence assessment (demonstrating how much both sides knew about each other).
November 1, 1956	Bulgarian Military Intelligence Information on the Situation in Hungary and Poland This intelligence report discusses the domestic political developments in Poland after the ascent of Wladyslaw Gomulka to the top of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR).The events surrounding the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 are also mentioned.