Search | Wilson Center Digital Archive

Switch to Visualization

United States. Department of State Clear All

Related Resources

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State

-

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Placeholder image for when a places image is not available

Western Europe

France

Nuclear Proliferation

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

Photograph of the Port of Jaffa in Israel.

Middle East

Israel

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research

-

Indian Nuclear History

French Nuclear History

Pakistani Nuclear History

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

Hughes, Thomas Lowe

1925 -

Photograph from the 1995 NPT Review Conference

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)

1989 -

Placeholder image for when a portrait image is not available

United States. Embassy (Turkey)

-

Michal Onderco

Onderco, Michal

-

Results:

281 - 290 of 393

Display:

Sort By:

Documents

January 18, 1984	Note, Argentine Ambassador Garcia del Solar to the Argentine Foreign Ministry, on US Secretary of State George Shultz's Visit to Brazil On the eve of the trip of American Secretary of State George Shultz to Brazil, the American officer responsible for the Brazilian desk at the Department of State conveys to the Argentine Embassy in Washington that the United States would appreciate an initiative toward the implementation of a system of mutual inspections or a joint declaration in which both countries would renounce the development of a nuclear device, the same two points proposed by American Congressman Paul Finley in 1977.
September 1977	Draft Letter to B. Cardledge on Conversation with US Deputy Undersecretary of State Joseph Nye on South African Nuclear Intentions Nye stated that at present the United States preferred to "concentrate on pressing South Africa to adhere to the NPT rather than continuing to enquire about the nature of the Kalahari facility." The State Department assessment was that while South Africa was capable of building a bomb at short notice, they did not actually plan to test one at this time.
August 25, 1970	United States Department of State, Memorandum from Martin Jacobs to Mr. Nelson on South African Nuclear Scientist’s Visit US Nuclear Testing Facilities Martin Jacobs reports that Dr. J. V. Retief, Senior Scientist of the National Nuclear Research Center of the South African Atomic Energy Board requested permission to visit an Army Corps research facility, the Cratering Group Research Labratory at Livermore, California. Jacobs was concerned that "there might be political repercussions if it appeared the US was assisting South Africa to produce nuclear explosives as a prelude to weapons development."
February 26, 1989	Memorandum of Conversation: President Bush's Meeting with Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the People's Republic of China, February 26, 1989, 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon Conversation between Deng Xiaoping and President George Bush on Sino-US relations. Deng expressed the hope that the bilateral relationship would develop in a "new pattern" based on mutual trust, mutual support, and minimizing as much as possible mutual problems. They also discussed the continued tensions between China and the Soviet Union,
August 12, 1996	US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader' Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.
January 24, 1996	State Department Telegram 012545 to Intsum Collective, 'Intsum: India: Nuclear Test Unlikely' Provides an overview of preparations for the nuclear test as well as a discussion on the pressures weighing on Indian Prime Minister Rao to launch the test. Prepared by one of INR’s South Asia experts, Steven Ghitelman, it provides an overview of the test site preparations that began in November and decided described Prime Minister Rao as facing pressures to test from the BJP and from the nuclear establishment. The pressures were not insurmountable because other considerations were important, such as avoiding international sanctions, continuing steps toward economic liberalization, and pressures to support the CTBT. Ghitelman concluded that it would be “vintage Rao” for him to allow the scientists to prepare for a test “while not authorizing them to conduct one.” That is what happened.
January 19, 1996	State Department Telegram 008785 to US Embassy India, 'CTBT Letter from the President: India-Specific Talking Points' A State Department telegram outlining talking points on why supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was in India's best interest. As it became evident that Rao was not going to make a decision to test, President Clinton resumed pressure for Indian support for the CTBT by signing off on a letter to Rao about the test ban. The State Department sent the Embassy talking points about the value of Indian support for the CTBT for Ambassador Wisner to use when delivering the Clinton letter.
December 15, 1995	Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing' State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.
December 15, 1995	Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test' The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”
December 11, 1995	State Department Telegram 285472 to US Embassy in Tokyo, 'ACDA Director Hollum’s Meeting with Japanese Officials' Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.