A collection of the Soviet and Afghan leadership's statements and intentions. The Soviet leadership highlights the improvement of economic, political, and moral support for Afghanistan.

Qaddafi seeks Bulgarian assistance in his attempt to close a deal with the Soviet Union for purchase of weapons and for construction of a nuclear power plant. Todor Zhivkov in turn requests a loan. Both leaders discuss the situation in Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Syria, Chad, Sudan, and Western Sahara.

The document summarizes Czechoslovak Politburo Secretary Vladimir Koucki's conversations with UAR President Gamal A. Nasser, Vice President Zakaria Muhi al-Din,and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Secretary Ali Sabri during his visit to the UAR. The conversations concerned the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the UAR's military and economic situation. Koucki draws three conclusions about the UAR's position, mentioning pressure from internal and external reactionary forces and the lagging national economy. The appendix contains a report on military issues raised during a conversation between the commander of the UAR armed forces, General Muhammad Fawzi, and General Miroslav Smoldash of the Czech delegation. Koucki attributes Egypt's defeat in the war to technical and tactical weaknesses of the military leadership. He recommends that Czech cooperation with the UAR include economic support, military training, and delivery of military equipment.

Comrade Kliszko presents Liu Ningyi with a letter from six socialist countries calling for a conference to discuss aid and coordination in Vietnam in response to "American imperialism." He urges China to rally against this common enemy, despite the ideological differences dividing the socialist nations. Liu responds harshly both to the proposal and to Comrade Kliszko's statement, arguing China "did not want anything to do with a revisionist clique of the Soviet Union’s leadership and its lackeys."

The two leaders talk about recent developments in the Middle East, US-Arab relations, and Soviet support for Arab regimes.

East German Document describing the speech by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This German translation of Brezhnev's speech was circulated to the SED leadership.

Report from the East German representatives on the Interkit meeting held in Sofia in February 1971. Reports on recent changes in Chinese foreign policy and international political strategies.

A report based on military intelligence information and on Zhivkov's conversation with the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev.

Zhivkov presents the BCP position on the Six-Day War.

The two leaders discuss the situation in the Middle East, and the role of the superpowers - the US and the Soviet Union.