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Documents

April 30, 1953

Cable from N. Spencer Barnes to US Department of State Reviewing Developments in the GDR since Stalin’s Death

Barnes analyzes developments within the GDR following Stalin’s death. Although there was an initial period of confusion within the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), it has been confirmed that Ulbricht is now directing SED and is continuing to implement socialization policy, though perhaps less dramatically than in the past. Barnes suggests that the Soviets may also be striving, to some extent, to decrease zonal tension.

October 27, 1962

Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Dean Rusk on Meeting with Anatoly F. Dobrynin

Robert Kennedy relays the results of a meeting with Dobrynin regarding the shooting down of an American plane over Cuba and the presence of long-range missiles there.

November 2, 1978

'IAEA Safeguards in Pakistan,' State Department cable 279373 to US Embassy Austria, for US Mission IAEA

The State Department asks for information on a letter sent by IAEA Director General Eklund to Munir Khan of the Pakistani atomic energy commission. IAEA inspectors in Pakistan should also be alert to "any questionable use of facilities or disposition of safeguarded material."

November 4, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' Department of State cable 281962 to US Embassy United Kingdom et al.

U.S. demarche and "non-paper" on Pakistan's attempts to complete the plutonium reprocessing plant and develop nuclear weapons. Sent to 12 countries to ensure that they "exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities."

November 6, 1978

'US Demarche on Pakistani Reprocessing Plant,' US Embassy United Kingdom cable 18209 to State Department

United Kingdom response to U.S. demarche on Pakistani nuclear development. U.K. and U.S. Embassies will be cooperating in delivering information to Spain and Belgium.

August 24, 1973

Memorandum, from Holsey G. Handyside, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Office of Atomic Energy and Aerospace, to Seymour Weiss, 'Speculation: Possibility of High Level Contact Between US and French Governments'

This speculates on the French/U.S. missile connection and notes that Blancard is probably a key player, having most likely met with officials in Washington. Blancard would have reported any such talks to Galley, and so Schlesinger will need to be properly informed about the situation before meeting with Galley.

April 1, 1974

From Donald R. Cotter, Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy, to Major General Wickham, 'Nuclear Safety Talks with France'

Cotter briefs Wickham on recent talks with the French, noting that they have centered mostly on nuclear safety issues. He briefly outlines what he will soon write to Baron, and notes that the French mainly want further operational assistance.

January 23, 1980

Report on the talks of Gyula Horn, representative of the HSWP CC Foreign Department in The United States and Canada

This document provides a summary of the main points covered in a meeting of Hungary, the United States, and Canada. The US expresses concern about the Soviet's offensive in Afghanistan, how it may lead to a preponderance of Soviet power in the region. The US contends it needs to maintain its influence in the Middle East-despite additional Soviet influence-as it is important for raw materials.

November 18, 1978

'Pakistan Proliferation Problem,' Department of State Cable 292469 to US Embassy United Kingdom

Discussion of a British list of countries that were actual or potential manufacturers of inverters. The U.S. does not want to approach any "nuclear threshold states" yet because some might not cooperate or might inform Pakistan. Also discusses strategies for approaching the Soviet Union and China in the future.

November 24, 1978

'Pakistan Proliferation Problem,' US Embassy United Kingdom Cable 19322 to Department of State

Britain agrees with U.S. thinking on the matter of State Department cable 292469, except on its approach to the Soviet Union. Britain decided not to approach the Soviets because they were unsure whether Moscow’s “commitment to nonproliferation outweighs their special political interests vis-à-vis Pakistan.”

Pagination