Guevara discusses Cuban economic development, Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda, a proposed PURS (United Party of the Socialist Revolution) party program, and a training program for Cubans in the Soviet Union.

Alekseyev and Guevera discuss Soviet and Cuban foreign and economic relations, and trip to the Soviet Union proposed by N.S. Khrushchev.

Hungarian Ambassador to Bulgaria Karoly Prath summarizes developments on Bulgarian-Cuban relations gathered from Hungarian-Bulgarian diplomatic contacts. Bulgarian-Cuban relations were not adversely effected by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The relationship is dominated by economic development (e.g. the expansion of trade, specialist exchanges, Bulgarian loans to Cuba, the root causes of Cuba's economic difficulties). Prath also discusses Bulgarian concerns over the influence of China on Cuba.

Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Erzsébet Görög writes a preliminary assessment of Castro’s state visit to the Soviet Union in 1963. Görög reports on improvements in Cuba’s party organization and positive reactions from the Cuban public and media on Castro’s visit. Görög notes different reactions to the visit between the economic/technical and artistic intelligentsia, adding that “Khrushchev managed to win Fidel over to his side in the Soviet-Chinese dispute.” Other topics include emigration and external counter-revolutionary activities.

Hungarian Ambassador to Cuba József Szipka reports on Soviet-Cuban relations from the early stages of the Cuban revolution to the present. The Cuban government depends on economic, military and political aid; trade agreements; and cultural and scientific exchanges from socialist governments, primarily the Soviet Union. Szipka adds that the Soviet Union’s flexible political steps during the Cuban Missile Crisis ensured Cuba’s security from a US invasion. From Szipka’s perspective, the missile crisis was a valuable learning experience for Cuban officials.

János Kádár presents on his diplomatic trip to Moscow to the Hungarian Central Committee. Kádár first places the Cuban Missile Crisis in context. This includes describing the success of the Cuban revolution, US aggression towards Cuba, and the Cuban-Soviet military and defense agreement, which ultimately spawned the US’s unilateral military mobilization. Kádár then describes the Soviet Union’s strategy to achieve two goals: protect the Cuban revolution and preserve peace. He notes that Cuba and the Soviet Union disagree about how the crisis was resolved, but asks the congress of workers to show complete support of Soviet actions and successes.

Hungarian ambassador to Czechoslovakia Lajos Cséby summarizes Deputy Head of the Sixth Main Department [of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs] Stross’s report on relations between Cuba and Czechoslovakia. Stross reports friendly relations between the two countries, which did not experience difficulties during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Stross outlines Cuba’s problems, economically and politically, and believes that Cuba’s revolutionary success depends on its economic growth. Cuba misunderstood the Soviet Union’s approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis. This led to signs of Chinese influence on Cuban politics, which Stross believes are reversing since Castro’s [1963] visit to the Soviet Union.

In a memorandum, Konstantin Tellalov, Head of the Foreign Policy and International Relations Department of the Central Committee of BCP, and Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev evaluate Cuban-Bulgarian relations. Tellalov and Bashev contextualize Cuba's development both nationally and internationally. Cuba's primary concerns are related to its economy (re: housing, rationing, embargo). Cuba's leadership continues to display a limited understanding of Marxism-Leninism, scientific planning (central planning), and the importance of COMECON. Taking into consideration the Bulgarian delegation’s recent visit to Cuba, they stress the importance of Cuba's success and the need for a radical, all-embracing commitment to relations.

The Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo report includes three main documents: a protocol and resolution with notes, a top secret information note, and a top secret protocol from 30 July 1970. The first section includes the Politburo's approval of the delegation's negotiations with Cuba, proposals to restructure economic partnership, and the Bulgarian delegation's statements on miscommunication between Cuba and Bulgaria. The second section, top secret information note, summarizes important exchanges during the Bulgarian visit to Cuba (e.g. Zhivkov's discussion on the importance of economic cooperation (COMECON) to the development of socialism). The third section, the top secret protocol, includes portions of a conversation between Bulgarian delegation and Cuban Politburo members. Castro summarizes ideas exchanged during the state visit.

An excerpt on Cuba from Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev's secret speech, “About Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the World Communist Movement,” to the CPSU CC Plenum on 9 April 1968.