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Documents

September 23, 1956

Untitled report about a Communist delegation's visit to Moscow

Delegates from Damascus and Cairo visit Moscow to visit the Russian Labor Union and request support in the Canal cause, labor issues, and other policy areas.

February 15, 1955

Letter to the CPSU Central Committee, Request for Material Aid to Amirkhizi of the People's Party of Iran

This note requests the CPSU Central Committee to give 1800 rubles a month to Amirkhizi, a member of the CC of the People's Party of Iran, until permanent work is found for him. Handwritten note at the bottom of the page confirms he received assistance.

February 18, 1953

CPSU Politburo Decision Along with Proposals from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade

Decision to adopt the proposal made by the Minister of Foreign Trade and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to defer the DPRK's loan payments represented in the Agreement of 14 November 1951.

October 24, 1960

Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 24 October 1960

In a meeting with the PRC military delegation, Kim Kwang-hae gives a report to express gratitude on military, economic and technical aid from China and confirms the mutual friendship between PRC and DPRK.

October 1, 1960

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 1 October 1960

Kim Il Sung shows his gratitude for Khrushchev's speech at the 15th UN General Assembly and explains a new decree to increase distribution to agricultural cooperative members.

September 30, 1960

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 30 September 1960

A.M. Puzanov provides Pak Geum Cheol information on 1) upcoming conference of representatives of Communist and worker's Parties 2) State Committee decision to transfer technical documentations in response to Kim Il Sung's request 3) impression on newly-introduced bonus payment system in agricultural cooperatives.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 6, 1953

Summary Memorandum, US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (August 6)

In 1953, Secretary Dulles met President Rhee to discuss the US-ROK mutual defense treaty. This summary memorandum notes twelve of Rhee’s requests and/or points he will like this treaty to incorporate. These include the number of ROKA divisions, which economic model the US should use to help Korea’s economy, and the request for moral and material support for the ROK to resume war with the north. This summary also notes whether the US granted, wanted to further discuss, or rejected each point.

August 6, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Second Session)

During the second Dulles-Rhee conference, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles led the discussion with the subject of Korean rehabilitation. Rhee makes a few suggestions that both sides should consider if Korean reconstruction should take place. These suggestions include: 1) rehabilitating Korean productive industry, 2) directly allocating money for Korea’s rehabilitation instead of doing so through the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and, 3) prevent the importation of Japanese technicians to Korea. Dulles answers he will consider Rhee suggestions, however, the US will continue to aid Japan to prevent losing her to communism.

August 14, 1953

Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All Diplomatic Officials

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

Pagination