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Documents

April 10, 1978

Letter from the Representatives of Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America to the President of the UN Security Council on Proposed Resolution on Namibia

Letter from Western powers delineating their plan for implementation of Security Council Resolution 365, on Namibian independence. Includes processes for holding elections, the creation of the United Nations Special Representative, and transition of power over to the government of Namibia.

December 2, 1975

Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Gerald R. Ford

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger met with Chairman Mao and spoke about Chinese-U.S. relations, Japanese-U.S. relations, Chinese foreign relations with Japan and Western countries, NATO, the Sinai Agreement, and Soviet attempts to expand influence in Africa.

October 21, 1975

Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Henry A. Kissinger

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met Chairman Mao at his residence in Peking. The two argued about the importance of U.S.-Chinese relations in American politics. Mao repeats that the United States' concerns order America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and lastly China. Kissinger responds that the Soviet Union, as a superpower, is frequently dealt with, but in strategy China is a priority. Throughout the conversation, Mao continues to point out his old age and failing health. The leaders also discuss European unity, Japanese hegemony, German reunification, and the New York Times.

November 12, 1973

Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong and Henry Kissinger

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai. The three discussed a large range of topics from Sino-Soviet relations to the Middle East to the influence of Chinese communism.

February 17, 1973

Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Henry Kissinger

Mao Zedong and Kissinger's meeting was aimed at establishing political relations between China and the United States. They discussed the following issues: U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the differences in ideology, Western German policy towards the Soviet Union, the amount of American overseas troops, the Vietnam War, trade barriers between two nations, Chinese-Japanese relations, and the historical issues between Germany and Britain during WWII.

January 19, 1954

Central Intelligence Agency, NIE 12.4-54, Probable Developments in Eastern Germany Through 1955

Estimating the current situation and probable developments in East Germany through 1955.

May 24, 1974

Memorandum of Conversation between Emil Bodnaras and Harry G. Barnes, US Ambassador to Romania

December 11, 1953

National Security Council, NSC 174, Draft 'United States Policy Toward The Soviet Satellites In Eastern Europe'

This report by the National Security Council discusses Soviet control over Eastern Europe, barriers to Soviet control of the satellites, and the power threat that consolidation poses to the United States. As a result, the NSC recommends that United States pursue a policy of resistance towards Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites, and should impose pressure and propaganda to weaken Soviet influence.

November 17, 1967

Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

July 10, 1953

CIA Special Supplement to the Current Intelligence Weekly

This CIA report contains a chronological breakdown of the nature and extent of the riots and demonstrations in East Germany, and descriptions of the Soviet reaction, East German capabilities, East German government reaction, and the Soviet policy reaction. According to the report, at this point, the USSR has not yet revealed any long-term policy reaction to the German situation.

Pagination