1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
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1986 -
July 29, 1989
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 July 1989 describes the latest developments in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Honduras, Cambodia, the Soviet Union, China, Chile, Sri Lanka, India, and Panama.
January 7, 1989
The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for 7 January 1989 covers developments in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Panama, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and Armenia. Certain portions of the document are redacted due to b(1) and b(3) exemptions.
May 23, 1986
Erich Honecker and Song Jian discuss increased cooperation between China and East Germany on matters of science and technology, and recent technological improvements in East Germany. Honecker also provides the East German perspective on the current nuclear situation.
August 6, 1991
DPRK Ambassador addresses DPRK's position on denuclearization of Korea peninsula and mentions a proposal to submit Presidential draft resolutions to the Security Council and to the General Assembly regarding the UN membership application.
June 26, 1991
Permanent Observer of DPRK broached two questions to SG regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula and the application of UN membership.
August 11, 1961
Khrushchev explains the Soviet Union's decision to resume nuclear testing, attributing it to ongoing threats from Western powers and the lack of genuine progress on disarmament. He criticizes the US, Britain, and France for continuing nuclear tests and accuses them of using peaceful testing as a cover to improve their weapons. Emphasizing that true security can only come through complete disarmament, Khrushchev defends Soviet actions as necessary for national defense while reaffirming the USSR's broader commitment to global peace and disarmament.
December 8, 1959
Nikita Khrushchev outlines a proposal to the CPSU CC Presidium for a significant reduction in the USSR's armed forces by 1 to 1.5 million personnel, even without reciprocal actions from other countries. He argues that the Soviet Union's advancements in missile technology and nuclear capabilities ensure its defense without the need for a large standing army, thereby enhancing economic efficiency and bolstering international prestige. Khrushchev emphasizes that such unilateral disarmament would reduce Cold War tensions, undermine militaristic factions globally, and improve the Soviet Union’s image as a proponent of peace. He suggests transitioning to a mixed system of professional and territorial (militia) forces to maintain readiness while lowering costs. The proposal aims to strengthen both domestic and international support for the USSR while showcasing the superiority of the socialist system.
This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
May 9, 1959
Deputy Minister Winiewicz instructs chiefs of all diplomatic posts on how to respond to questions about the Rapacki Plan. He confirms that they will uphold the Rapacki Plan, but the topics of the Geneva conference should be limited in scope and focused on a peace treaty with Germany.
March 3, 1959
Code message from Ambassador Dorosz to Rodziński regarding the Foreign Minister of Turkey's first official statement on the Rapacki Plan. Dorosz notes Turkey's lack of interest in the Plan thus far.
January 20, 1959
Milnikiel writes to Winiewicz regarding a conversation between Milnikiel and British Deputy foreign secretary O’Neill. O'Neill does not think the Rapacki Plan should currently be brought up in light of the broader proposals on Germany.