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Documents

February 5, 1968

Information on the Situation in Korea

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia analyzes the underlying context behind and causes of the Pueblo Incident and other dangerous military engagements on the Korean Peninsula.

July 30, 1967

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.276, July 30, 1967

I. Horjenevski and A. Lazar discuss Czech loans to North Korea and the important purges taking place in North Korea an effort to achieve the "monolithic unity" of the Korean Workers' Party.

November 15, 1968

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 15 November 1968

The Hungarian Embassy provides a brief on a visit by the Japanese Communist Party to North Korea.

May 16, 1969

Note Number 399 from Pierre Cerles to Michel Debré, 'China and Eastern Europe'

Pierre Cerles provides an assessment of Chinese foreign policy toward Eastern Europe during the 1960s within the context of the Sino-Soviet split, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Cultural Revolution, and China's own internal leadership divisions.

June 30, 1960

Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo Resolution Regarding Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba

Resolution of the Bulgarian Communist Party to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. A report is presented which describes current Cuban economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union, as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia.

November 24, 1989

Speech by Premier Ladislav Adamec at the Extraordinary Session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee

This transcript shows the Czech party elites choosing against violent repression of the mass protests in Wenceslas Square. More clearly than in almost any other Party document, the reasons for nonviolence are spelled out: such a solution would only temporarily "return calm," it would radicalize the youth, "the international support of the socialist countries can no longer be counted on," and "the capitalist states" might react with a "political and economic boycott."

November 6, 1962

Report on Visit to Prague by Cuban Communist Party Leader Blas Roca Calderio

Calderio's visit to Prague in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis served to solidify the ties between Cuba and Czechoslovakia, relations that would persist until the end of the Cold War. Among the activities of Calderio's visit included attendance of 12th Party Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, meeting with Cuban ambassadors to China, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a promise to attend the meeting of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

October 27, 1962

Report to CPCz General Secretary Antonin Novotný

The report to Novotny details the happenings of the Cuban Missile Crisis at that time. Great Britain feels out of the loop and hurt by not being consulted by the United States before it took action, while Kennedy is not backing down on the blockade until the missiles are removed. According to the message, it is unclear whether there are nuclear missiles in Cuba at all; an American army colonel admits to the UN that no traces have been found, despite hundreds of photographs taken. In Czechoslovakia, the situation is unchanged; troops are still on alert and awaiting combat orders, with morale running high. There are even some volunteers willing to go to Cuba and aid their Latin comrades.

October 26, 1962

Report on “Extraordinary Measures” Regarding Czechoslovak Organizations

This concerns the status of Czechoslovak domestic organizations at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Included in the report are the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, Central Council of Labor Unions, Czechoslovak Union of Youth, and the National Front.

October 28, 1962

Report to Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCz) General Secretary Antonin Novotný on European Military Situation

This report to Antonin Novotny details the European military situation at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Most NATO troops were on combat alert, but no increased activity or suspicious movements were reported. The Czechoslovak Armed Forces were at combat ready status to repel any attack by NATO.

Pagination