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Documents

May 5, 1984

Telegram to D. Steward From Auret

Description of a meeting between Angolan and South African delegations, the former being led by Venancio De Moura. Details discussion of troop withdrawal from Namibia, focusing on an "outburst" by De Moura.

March 21, 1984

Letter from C.A. Crocker to R.F. Botha

Chester Crocker writes to R. F. "Pik" Botha about the importance of not responding to the recent Cuban/Angolan communique. Crocker warns against giving the Cubans an excuse to keep their troops stationed in Namibia, and points out that it is likely a distraction for concessions the Cubans and Angolans are about to make to South Africa and the United States.

September 12, 1984

Memorandum of Conversation between Pedro Maria Tonha, Konstantin Kurochkin and Polo Cintra Frías, 'Versión de la conversación sostenida en el Ministerio de Defensa de la RPA el 12 de septiembre de 1984'

Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedalé" was the defense minister of Angola; General Konstantin Kurochkin was the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola; General Polo Cintra Frías was the head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola

March 6, 1984

Message of R.F. Botha to the Governments of the United States, Angola, and Zambia

Message from R. F. "Pik" Botha declaring that, despite SWAPO incursions into Namibia, South African forces have not retaliated, in order to give the maximum amount of time for Angola to make good on its promise to withdraw its forces. South Africa will, however, maintain a military presence in Namibia while he threat is still there.

1989

Defense Intelligence Agency Briefing, 'The 1987-88 Combat in Southern Angola: Lessons Learned'

Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

March 18, 1988

Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz, 'Cuban Armed Forces Ministry Communique on Cuban-Angolan Defense of Cuito Cuanavale'

A Cuban Defense Ministry communiqué details the “heroic defense” by Cuban and Angolan troops of Cuito Cuanavale against a South African onslaught. The brunt of the fighting was done by local Angolan forces, which successfully managed to repel the South African invaders.

January 29, 1988

Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz,'The Military Situation in Angola -- Cubans Deny UNITA Seizure of Strategic Town'

A telegram from United States Interests Section in Havana to Secretary of State Shultz describing Cuban reactions to reports that UNITA captured the strategic Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale, capital city of Cuando Cubango. Cuban press call such claims false and lies of the racist South Africans.

December 2, 1987

Confidential Telegram from USINT Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz, 'Cuba Describes Geographic Position and Military Role of its Forces in Angola'

Telegram from United States Interests Section in Havana to Secretary of State George Shultz describing the placement of Cuban forces in Angola and the justification that they are not taking part in active combat.

1975

Meeting Transcript, Kissinger and Brezhnev Discuss Angola in Moscow

Kissinger questions Brezhnev about Cuban involvement in Angola and asks if the Cubans will withdraw if the South Africans do. Brezhnev gives no definitive answers.

December 3, 1975

Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Delegation led by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping

Chinese delegation visits the White House and discusses Angola. The Chinese emphasize that South Africa must exit the conflict if there is to be any chance of rallying other African states to oppose Neto.

Pagination