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February 2, 1956

Note Containing an Assessment of the Parameters of a Device with Yields of 150 Megatons and One Billion Tons of TNT

A report on the material requirements and design specifications of nuclear devices with yields of 150MT and one milliard tons TNT between Soviet officials. Specifically, the use of lithium-6 deuteride and natural uranium in varying degrees is discussed.

July 30, 1987

Embassy Islamabad telegram 16052 to Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case—July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy'

Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.

July 30, 1987

Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16052 to the Department of State, 'Pervez Nuclear Arrest Case - July 23 Statement by MFA Spokesman Gives Greater Emphasis to Conspiracy'

Only a few weeks after Pervez’s arrest, Under Secretary of State Armacost traveled to Pakistan for wide ranging discussions with General Zia, but with a special focus on nuclear procurement and the uranium enrichment program.

August 3, 1987

Embassy Islamabad Telegram 16389 to Department of State, 'Armacost-Sattar Roundtable: Nuclear Issues'

Armacost reported to Secretary Shultz, “I emphasized the need for immediate practical steps to demonstrate to an aroused Congress and a skeptical administration that no further illegal procurement activities would take place and that we had verifiable assurances there would be no further enrichment of weapons-grade uranium.”

July 23, 1987

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Memorandum from Kenneth Adelman for the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 'The Pakistani Procurement Cases'

With Pakistan already violating the “red line” on uranium enrichment, Adelman believed that without a display of resolve “presidential credibility” would be further damaged; that required cutting off aid under the Solarz amendment.

May 29, 1986

Embassy Islamabad Cable 11791 to Department of State, 'Nuclear: Solarz Conversation with GOP'

The year after Congress passed the Solarz amendment in August 1985, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-CA) traveled to Pakistan, a country that would become a major test case for the amendment which cut off U.S. foreign aid to recipients. Solarz confronted General Zia and other top officials with his perception, based on U.S. intelligence, that Pakistan’s Kahuta plant was enriching weapons-grade enriched uranium. The Pakistanis strenuously denied the charge.

November 22, 1985

Embassy Bonn Telegram 35237 to Department of State, 'Export of Uranium Enrichment to Pakistan'

In response to the State Department's request, the Foreign Office found that the equipment had not been delivered and German firms had been informed that an export license needed to be granted.

September 19, 1985

Department of State Telegram 287763 to Embassy Bonn, 'Export of Uranium Enrichment equipment to Pakistan'

As these telegrams demonstrate, by the fall of 1986, if not earlier, the U.S. government believed that a Pakistani firm, Multinational Inc., was a “procurement agent” for A.Q. Khan’s secret network. In this case, Pakistani agents operating in West Germany were trying to secure aluminum tubes that could be used for the Khan Laboratory’s gas centrifuge program.

October 19, 1978

Statement by South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha Regarding Talks with the Western Five (excerpts)

Excerpts of a statement by P.W. Botha discussing South Africa's concern with the independence and security of its neighbors. Emphasizes South Africa's wish and ability to provide Namibia with continued money and infrastructure and warns against the threat that a Marxist Namibia would pose to the free world.

May 27, 1974

Confidential Note from Pierre Laurent to the French Foreign Minister

Pierre Laurent of the French Department of Scientific Affairs describes the first Indian nuclear test and the resulting reevaluation of French nuclear cooperation with India. New guarantees are suggested to ensure that French-supplied nuclear technology and materials could not be used in future Indian nuclear explosions.

Pagination