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Documents

September 20, 1972

Bulgarian Politburo decision on Intelligence Activity Against China

BCP CC Politburo approves the request of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Angel Tzanev, for an increase in the intelligence staff in response to the need for expanding intelligence operations in China, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia and Vietnam – a move closely coordinated with the KGB.

January 21, 1954

Report on the Reception of Yugoslavian Diplomat Vidic by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov

Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Yugoslav Ambassador Vidic. Topics of discussion include Austrian-Yugoslav relations, and the current state of relations with the Soviet Union. This memorandum was written one year after the Tito-Stalin split, and the founding of Titoism.

July 9, 1955

Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, N. A. Bulganin Address

Discussion in the CPSU CC Plenum on Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Bulganin deplores the situation reached due to the Soviet-Yugoslav split and calls for a rapprochement with Tito. Other CPSU members including Nikita Khrushchev agree.

November 27, 1956

Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 27 November 1956 (Re: Protocol No. 60)

These notes (part of the Malin Collection) describe Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s decision to negotiate with Yugoslavia regarding the fate of Imre Nagy after his arrest and transfer to Romania. The notes state that negotiations are inadvisable and remain the responsibility of Hungary. A second section of the document refers to instructions to the KGB for discrediting Nagy.

June 22, 1954

Letter from Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Josip Broz Tito and the Central Committee of the League of Communists Of Yugoslavia

Letter from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to Yugoslav leader Josep B. Tito suggesting that the time is ripe for a rapprochement between the two states and parties. Blaming former NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria and former Yugoslav leadership member Milovan Djilas for doing the work of the imperialists by attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet and Yugoslav people and parties, Khrushchev suggests that the ousting of both will increase rapprochement between the two countries and be the catalyst for a a summit between the two leaders.

July 24, 1954

Cable from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to Tito and Central Committee of the League Of Communists Of Yugoslavia

Letter from the CC CPSU to the CC LCY regarding the positive response given the CC CPSU by the CC LCY concerning the 22 June 1954 Soviet letter to the Yugoslav leadership suggesting the possibility of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. The Soviets also suggest that they support the Yugoslav position on the question of the city of Trieste, a disputed zone between the Yugoslavs and the Italians.

August 11, 1954

Letter from Tito and the Executive Committee [Politburo] of the CC LCY to Nikita Khrushchev and Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Yugoslav response to Soviet approaches about normalizing relations between the two countries and the two parties. While encouraged by the Soviet gestures, the Yugoslav leadership remains cautious and suggests that the rapprochement take a slow and steady course, taking into account the differences as well as the similarities between the two countries.

September 23, 1954

Letter from Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Tito and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

Nikita Khrushchev’s letter to Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito concerning the possibility of improving relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Soviet leader suggests that rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia can only be accomplished if both parties continue the exchange of views regarding mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country, peaceful coexistence, equality among parties, and world peace. Khrushchev goes on to suggest that a summit between party representatives should meet in order to further rapprochement.

September 27, 1954

Letter from Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to Tito and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia

The CC CPSU leadership letter of apology to the CC LCY for “an inappropriate formulation” that had escaped Soviet censors concerning the Yugoslav leadership in the second edition of the book Historical Materialism

January 1, 1953

Soviet Plan to Assassinate Tito

NKVD plan to assassinate Josip Broz Tito by a Soviet covert agent, codenamed “Max.” The plan envisions assassinating Tito during a private audience during Tito’s forthcoming visit to London, or at a diplomatic reception in Belgrade. This document was not dated.

Pagination