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March 10, 1967	US Embassy Bonn Telegram 10500 to State Department, 'Ambassador Foster’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger' To try to strengthen West German confidence, ACDA director William C. Foster met with Chancellor Kiesinger, who expressed concern about the danger of “erosion” and “uncertainty” in U.S.-West German relations and the need for more time for consultations. Kiesinger’s “own idea was that it would have been better …to have discussed all aspects of non-proliferation ‘behind locked doors’ before any intention of signing the treaty had become public.”
March 1, 1967	Gottfried William Moser, ACDA/Bureau of International Relations, 'Consultations with the FRG' In this report and after criticism over the NPT in West Germany, ACDA official G. William Moser looked into the chronology of U.S.-West German interactions. Noting that Washington had “stood foursquare with [the FRG] on the question of maintaining the MLF option under a non-proliferation treaty,” he highlighted a decision made by Rusk on 18 October 1966 to defer consultations with Bonn until he was sure that the Soviets were “serious” about the new Article I language. He concluded that Washington may need to explain Rusk's rationale.
February 22, 1967	US Department of State, Oral Note, 'Interpretations Regarding Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty Formulations' As an assurance to the Germans and other NATO allies, ACDA and the State Department drew up a memorandum on the interpretation of the NPT draft treaty. The key point was that the treaty “deals only with what is prohibited, not what is permitted.”
January 17, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George Bunn and Soviet Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, 'Non-Proliferation Treaty and Other Arms Control Matters' Information about the recent U.S.-West German discussions had leaked to the press and in this conversation, Vorontsov “wanted to know what we had told the Germans with respect to participation in a European nuclear force.” Bunn told him that the “Germans were concerned that nothing in the treaty stand in the way of steps which might ultimately produce a United States of Europe.”
January 13, 1967	Memorandum of Conversation between ACDA Director William C. Foster and West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'Draft Articles of Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with draft treaty attached In this conversation, ACDA director Foster met with Ambassador Knappstein for an extended discussion of the NPT. Topics included the treaty’s compatibility with a future European federation, consultations by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, the definition of a nuclear weapon, and the prohibition of national control over “peaceful nuclear explosives.”
December 29, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation with West German Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, 'German Concern Over Draft NPT Text' In this conversation, Ambassador Knappstein expressed concern over the draft of the NPT that Washington and Moscow had agreed on. Knappstein worried that the draft articles would foreclose “all of the available options for participation in nuclear defense."
July 11, 1966	Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to the Secretary of State, 'Comments on the Proposed Revision of the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with enclosures In this memorandum, McNamara, Rusk, and Adrian Fisher discuss amendments and language of the NPT treaty that was in stalemate that summer. Fisher saw the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, with its prohibition of the “transfer of atomic weapons to any other country,” as providing model language for an NPT because it was compatible with the bilateral agreements.
July 1, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation between William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Karl Carstens, State Secretary at the West German Foreign Office, 'Disarmament and Related Problems' In this conversation, West German State Secretary Karl Carstens told ACDA director William C. Foster that Bonn was still committed to a “hardware” solution, “if not in the form of an MLF than in some form.” Refraining from making any commitment, Foster wanted to leave the question “open.”
April 28, 1966	National Intelligence Estimate 23-66, 'West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons,' excised copy This NIE estimated that within two years Bonn could produce enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon, but only by violating safeguards on its nuclear facilities.The estimators, nevertheless, believed that Bonn “will probably want to keep open what options it has for the eventual production of nuclear weapons.”
October 27, 1965	'The Danger from a Psychotic Germany,' Appendix to 'The Case for a Strong American Lead to Establish a Collective Nuclear System That Would Help the Western World from Repeating an Old Mistake,' attached to George W. Ball to Secretary Rusk, et al. Under Secretary George W. Ball signed off on a fervent expression of his apprehensions about the direction of West German policy should the West fail to establish an MLF leading Bonn to feel “rejection and discrimination.” Ball saw three bad possibilities: a national nuclear program, a French-German nuclear deal, or “the real danger, a German political adventure.”