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Vest, George

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December 1986	Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack' This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in December 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.
October 1986	Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack' This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in October 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.
September 1986	Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack' This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in September 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.
August 1986	Committee for State Security (KGB), 'About Results of Intelligence Activities to Note Indicators for a Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack' This report from the KGB contains results from intelligence activities conducted in August 1986 aimed at exposing indicators of a surprise nuclear missile attack on the USSR.
November 12, 1976	London Embassy telegram 18324 to State Department, 'London Nuclear Suppliers’ Meeting, November 11 – 12' This telegram describes what the nuclear suppliers' countries accomplished during their November 11-12 meeting. Continued discussions of safeguards and enlarging the group, and agreed that they would wait on publishing results until after their next meeting, which was scheduled to be the following March in London.
June 11, 1976	George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting' This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.
January 27, 1976	George Vest to the Secretary, 'Nuclear Suppliers Status Report' In this document regarding the final agreement, George Vest wrote Kissinger that it “served to close many of the loopholes and inadequacies of previous nuclear cooperation agreements between suppliers and recipients.” It also put the French and West Germans on record to restrict access to sensitive nuclear technologies. Nevertheless, as Vest noted, the guidelines would not prevent “indigenous” development of nuclear capabilities and “unsafeguarded developments” or the acquisition of sensitive technology.
December 31, 1975	Memorandum from George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 'Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines' This document comprises the instructions which the White House approved for the September 1975 suppliers’ meeting. At the November meeting, the suppliers completed negotiations on guidelines. Basic provisions included agreement to seek assurances by recipients of supplies not to produce nuclear explosive devices, physical security for installations and materials, transfer of trigger list items only under IAEA safeguards, restraint in transfer of sensitive technologies, facilities and materials, and the encouragement of supplier involvement in, and multinational controls over, sensitive installations. Appended to the guidelines was a two page “trigger list” based on the Zangger Committee’s list.
October 15, 1975	Briefing Paper, 'Nuclear Suppliers Conference,' Secretary's Trip to Ottawa This document describes Canada's position on safeguards as well as the United State's position and how the U.S. will respond to Canada. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards," and although Washington had included the substance of full-scope safeguards in the original five-point paper but Kissinger would not go against the French and risk the hard-won understanding that had brought them into the group.
October 10, 1975	George Vest to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, 'British Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative re Suppliers Conference' This document describes the differing views regarding safeguards. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations”--a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities),” would make it possible to achieve “the practical equivalent” of the Canadian proposal.