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Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Warsaw Pact Military Planning

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Eastern Europe

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Eastern Europe

Poland

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Northern Africa

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Middle East

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Group photo from the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group Operational Basket Meeting, Antalya, Turkey, April 4-6, 1995.

ACRS Oral History Project

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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)

1989 -

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Fahmy, Nabil‏

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Pomper, Miles

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Einhorn, Robert J.

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Levite, Ariel ("Eli")

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Photograph from the 1995 NPT Review Conference

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

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Notte, Hanna

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Indian Nuclear History

Warsaw Pact

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin and the Cold War

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January 15, 1950	Memorandum No.3(7)-L/50 from the Officer in Charge, Indian Mission, Lhasa, to the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok The monthly report of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Tibet, for the period December 15, 1949, through January 15, 1950.
December 10, 1992	Michael Reilly (First Political Secretary, UK Embassy in Seoul) to Ian Bond (FCO Security Policy Department), '1992 US Burden Sharing Report' This document dates from the “lame duck” period of the George H.W. Bush administration, and centers on the renegotiating of the US defense position in on the peninsula. Amid pending changes in the early Clinton administration to burden sharing, the British were trying to pin down on what basis estimates of cost were being made on US Forces in Korea.
October 9, 1992	Ewan Buchanan to Warwick Morris (UK Embassy Seoul), 'U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting' A telegram from Ewen Buchanan, an arms control specialist with the FCO, to Warrick Morris, the UK Ambassador to Seoul.
December 5, 1961	Report from Seán Ronan to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Irish Resolution on Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’ (Confidential), New York [Excerpt] Aiken drafted in additional personnel to the Irish Mission to the UN in the run-in to the XVIth UN Session. Seán Ronan, the head of the political and information divisions at headquarters in Dublin, was sent as a delegate to the First Committee of the UN, involving him intensely in Aiken’s non-dissemination efforts. His insider account reveals some of the dynamics and calculations at play in the building, as Ireland managed a balancing act of engineering consensus between East and West. In large part, the Irish Mission crafted the resolution’s language to skirt the issue of alliance nuclear sharing in a bid to manufacture unanimity. The Irish had pondered co-sponsoring a Swedish draft resolution but anticipated that it would face resistance from NATO comparable to earlier iterations of the Irish resolution. Similarly, Ireland neglected to mention a proposed new disarmament committee in the draft resolution – there was no guarantee that it would form and report expeditiously. Finally, by drawing on the instrument of acclamation, the Irish sidestepped French objections and gained universal approval for Resolution 1665 (1961), wrapping the resolution in universal legitimacy.
July 14, 1959	Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington) First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry.
October 17, 1958	Press Release containing a Speech by Minister of External Affairs Frank Aiken and Draft Resolutions on Nuclear Disarmament Aiken’s first step was a modest paragraph calling for the formation of a UN commission to recommend measures to the next session. However, global attentions were focused on nuclear tests and their health effects, so Aiken linked his initiative with the American-led seventeen-power resolution requesting all states to suspend testing voluntarily. Aiken proposed an amendment to that motion that included the notion of brokering an understanding between nuclear weapons powers and non-nuclear powers. He submitted that the former voluntarily desist from supplying nuclear weapons to other countries, while non-nuclear powers reciprocated and volunteered not to develop such weapons during a test suspension. This proposed quid pro quo became a staple in the Irish resolutions subsequently and eventually be inscribed into the NPT. Aiken’s speech invoked recognizable tropes such as a ‘geometric’ increase in nuclear powers, creating an urgent need to halt the spread. His speech was seminal in identifying themes he and international opinion would rehearse in future years. He conjured up fears about small states and revolutionary groups with a bomb acting as ‘the detonator for world-wide thermonuclear war’. Aiken was perceptive – he expected criticisms about institutionalized equality between states (nuclear “haves” and “have nots”), harms to alliances, the sufficiency of test bans, and the absence of monitoring. He sought to disprove the validity of such critiques, and these issues were worked through gradually, eventually leading to the finalization of the NPT ten years later.
March 1, 1967	Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and Lord Chalfont at 6:50p.m. on 1 March 1967] Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.
July 1, 2001	U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 'Fact Sheet: Middle East Peace Process Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group' A Department of State summary of of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, released during the George W. Bush administration.
October 22, 2020	Interview with Süha Umar Süha Umar is a Turkish Ambassador (Rtd.) He served as Head of the Turkish Delegation to ACRS.
October 15, 2020	Interview with Eran Lerman Eran Lerman is a former Israeli intelligence officer. He served as a member of the Israeli delegation to ACRS.