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December 18, 1974

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State of the United States Henry Kissinger, 18 December 1974'

During a December 1974 conversation between Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Kissinger expressed frustration over the public release of a Soviet letter amid sensitive trade legislation in Congress. The discussion also covered U.S. and European coordination on the Pan-European Conference and ongoing Middle East negotiations, with Dobrynin warning that US unilateral actions risked undermining broader peace efforts and US-Soviet relations.

November 21, 1952

Despatch No. 261 from American Embassy Taipei to the Department of State, 'Monthly Political Report for September and October 1952'

The September-October 1952 political report highlights the Seventh National Congress of the Kuomintang, marking a significant structural and ideological shift with the adoption of reforms and the election of a youthful Central Committee. Chiang Ching-kuo's influence expanded, particularly at the working levels of the party, but he faced resistance at the top. Additionally, the report details the Overseas Chinese Affairs Conference, which aimed to unite overseas Chinese communities in support of anti-communist efforts and mainland recovery.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

November 13, 1952

Despatch No. 234 from American Embassy Taipei to the Department of State, 'Report on Foreign Relations at the Seventh National Congress of the Kuomintang'

The document  provides a comprehensive overview of the Chinese Nationalist Government's foreign policy, emphasizing its alignment with anti-communist efforts globally. It discusses Sino-American cooperation, including military and economic aid, the establishment of diplomatic ties in Southeast Asia, and the challenges of maintaining consular services in regions recognizing the Chinese Communist regime. The document underscores the importance of China's role in the United Nations and its relations with countries like Japan, aiming to strengthen global alliances against communism​.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

May 19, 1952

Despatch No. 536 from American Embassy Taipei to the Department of State, 'Convocation of Kuomintang National Congress'

The document discusses the potential convocation of the Kuomintang's (KMT) Seventh National Congress, following years of party reforms initiated after the amalgamation of the KMT and San Min Chu I Youth Corps. While proponents argue the reforms should culminate with the establishment of a formal Central KMT Committee, opponents express concerns about incomplete reforms and the inability to represent all KMT members, particularly those on the mainland. The Congress was tentatively planned for October 10, 1952.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

March 3, 2000

Gore and US Foreign Policy: Conversation with Leon Fuerth

The document records a conversation with Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore's National Security Adviser, discussing key issues in US foreign policy around March 2000. Topics included concerns about Northern Ireland, Russia's power under Putin, and tensions in Montenegro, China. Fuerth also expressed worries about campaign issues, particularly related to Gore's foreign policy priorities and his own potential future role as National Security Adviser.

December 10, 1992

Michael Reilly (First Political Secretary, UK Embassy in Seoul) to Ian Bond (FCO Security Policy Department), '1992 US Burden Sharing Report'

This document dates from the “lame duck” period of the George H.W. Bush administration, and centers on the renegotiating of the US defense position in on the peninsula. Amid pending changes in the early Clinton administration to burden sharing, the British were trying to pin down on what basis estimates of cost were being made on US Forces in Korea.

1987

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 39, Moscow, 1987, 512 pp.

The table of contents for volume 39 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the 27th CPSU Congress, the All-Union Meeting of the Leadership of the Regular and Military Units of the KGB, and other subjects.

1981

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 23, Moscow, 1981, 431 pp.

The table of contents for volume 23 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, Lenin and state security, training and education at the Higher School, intelligence activities of the United States and other adversaries to the Soviet Union, nuclear terrorism, and other subjects.

April 1, 1949

Letter, Jawaharlal Nehru to All Provincial Premiers

Nehru briefs the Provincial Premiers about internal and external developments. Nehru highlights the situation in China and states that the communists could soon take power in the whole of China. He speculates how this will affect other regions.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

Pagination