Cable No. 1314, Foreign Minister Ad Interim to the Ambassador, Delegation of Japan to the OECD, 'Chinese Student Demonstrations (Main Points of the Minister’s Statement)'

Confidential

Indefinite Duration

Top Urgent

Number: 049492-002 to Diplomatic Establishments  GM3899-03

Received: May 29, 1989, 19:27:11

Draft Telegram

Primary: China Division, Principal Deputy Director

Telegram Office: 1. [signed] 2. [signed]

Drafter: Kohara [小原]           Telephone: 2426

From: Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim

To: Ambassador, Delegation of Japan to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

Subject: Chinese Student Demonstrations (Main Points of the Minister’s Statement)

Primary: Asian Affairs, China

No. 1314 Top Urgent

Pattern Code: [blacked out]

Relay to Ambassador in China

Relayed cable number: No. 1467 Urgent Priority Handling

VVVVV

The main points of Minister Uno’s remarks on the situation in China that he made at the Japan-France Summit Meeting are as follows:

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GM3899

The Chinese Student Demonstrations (Main Points of Remarks)

1. Background and Current Situation

The Chinese student demonstrations that broke out on the occasion of the death of former secretary general Hu Yaobang have developed to the point of the imposition of martial law and the advance of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to the outskirts of Beijing. While the students were continuing their sit-in in the square in front of Tiananmen Square, a power struggle took place among party and government leaders. At the present point in time, there is a strong possibility that, with the support of Deng Xiaoping, the group represented by Li Peng has taken the leadership.

2. Background to the Demonstrations

In the background to the demonstrations are the dissatisfaction of the students in regard to lagging democratization and the resentment of the people in regard to hardships due to inflation since last year and to cadre corruption and injustice. There is an undercurrent of popular and deep-rooted dissatisfaction regarding Deng Xiaoping’s longstanding “dictatorship.” On the other hand, the authorities, preparing for the upcoming Chinese-Soviet summit meeting, were lacking in their understanding in regard to the student and popular dissatisfaction. One can also point out that their response was terribly inept.

3.Noteworthy Points

(1) Treatment of Zhao Ziyang and Others

A feature of this situation is that Zhao Ziyang, who has promoted reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, having incurred Deng’s displeasure, is being brought down by him (this resembles the downfall of Hu Yaobang). From this point of view, naturally, there is the possibility that “disposing” of Zhao as a “counterrevolutionary element” and such will turn into an issue of responsibility for Deng. Should Zhao be removed from the leadership, how they “dispose” of him remains unsettled.

(2) Decline in Party’s Prestige

Behind these demonstrations developing beyond the anticipation of the present leadership is the lack of recognition on the part of the authorities regarding the democratization movement and such, as well as the ineptness of their response at each critical juncture. This raises the question of whether it will really be possible for the Communist Party within its existing framework to absorb the will of the people. In that sense, too, if they do not seriously tackle the problems in the background to the student demonstrations and achieve some results, then will not the party’s foundation necessarily grow increasingly unstable?

(3) Reform and Opening Policy

No matter how these demonstrations develop, the basic direction of “reform and opening” is unlikely to change, but the deterioration of party and government leadership is undeniable. The worry is that in the short term it [reform and opening] will slow down or stagnate. Japan intends to keep a close eye on future developments.

Relayed to [Japanese diplomatic missions in] China.

(End)