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September 3, 1968

The Position of the Communist Party of Cuba Towards the Conference of the Communist Parties and the Problems of the International Revolutionary Movement

This report describes how the Cuban Communist Party's position diverges from the broader international communist movement and how it desires to maintain neutrality in Sino-Soviet disputes.

June 4, 1969

Cipher No. 6247 from Havana

This document discusses Cuba's decision to send observers to a Soviet-led conference, highlighting their shift from a previously neutral position due to pressure from Brezhnev and the Soviet Politburo. The decision, driven by the desire to maintain Soviet support during a difficult period, was met with caution due to fears of Chinese economic retaliation, signaling potential tensions in Sino-Cuban relations.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962

In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.

October 18, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

September 22, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 22 September 1962

Jelen compiles this report from his conversation with the USSR Ambassador [Aleksandr] Alekseyev. Alekseyev believes that the Soviet declaration from the 11th removed the danger of more serious [US] military action [against Cuba]. At the same time, he takes into account the possibility of the attempts of staging subversive landings, as well as the possibility of activities [carried out] by Cuban emigrant pirates against the ships. The two also discuss economic aid to Cuba, especially in the form of foodstuffs.