On April 28, 1975, Kissinger urgently informed the Soviet Union that North Vietnamese forces had begun shelling Saigon’s airport and the U.S. Embassy complex, killing two Marines and disrupting the evacuation, which he claimed violated an assumed two-week timeframe and risked forcing American military intervention. Ambassador Dobrynin dismissed Kissinger’s insinuations of Soviet involvement.

In an April 22, 1975 conversation, Henry Kissinger conveyed President Ford's concern to the Soviet Union about North Vietnamese troop movements near Saigon's airport, warning that any attempt to trap Americans could force US military intervention, while General Scowcroft clarified that Marines were positioned offshore for potential deployment but Ford preferred to avoid their use if possible.

In an April 1975 meeting, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger urgently requested Soviet assistance in facilitating a temporary ceasefire in Vietnam to ensure the safe evacuation of American personnel and South Vietnamese allies, emphasizing the Ford Administration's need for an orderly exit to maintain credibility.

This memorandum records a conversation between Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on April 3, 1975. Topics discussed included U.S. assurances about Soviet submarines, limitations on U.S. technology shared with Japan, and preparations for Soviet leader Brezhnev’s visit to the U.S. Kissinger also shared views on Middle East peace efforts, Southeast Asia, and ongoing disarmament negotiations, emphasizing cautious cooperation while maintaining strategic priorities.

I. Shcherbakov and Pham Van Dong discuss Soviet-Vietnamese relations, the last developments on the battlefield, and American "peace maneuvers."

Polish official, Jerzy Michalowski, discusses the Vietnamese situation after meeting with several high ranking officials there. He asserts that the Vietnamese misguided in their belief that the US is not willing to fight a broadened war. He also notes that, although Vietnamese allies recognize this, they discourage Vietnam from opening negotiations.

A Chinese response to a statement from the Soviet Union, arguing that the Soviets look only to extend their influence over Vietnam, and not to truly help it to defeat the United States. It points out several examples of Soviet aid to Vietnam, which China believes had ulterior motives.

The Chinese response to the Soviet request for China's opinion on a possible international conference on the subject of Indochina. The Chinese opinion is that to propose such a thing would make the Communist countries look weak and only encourage the United States.

S.P. Kozyrev and the Canadian Ambassador review Soviet policy toward the resolution of the Pueblo Incident and the connections between developments in Vietnam and the military situation on the Korean Peninsula.

A report on the cooperation between between North Korea and Vietnam.