In this November 1979 conversation, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin confronted former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger over his increasingly anti-Soviet rhetoric and alignment with Republican hardliners, which Dobrynin criticized as opportunistic and damaging to détente. Kissinger defended his shift as a tactical response to domestic political pressures and his ambitions to return to government, while still insisting he valued stable Soviet-American relations. The discussion also touched on US fears of instability in Saudi Arabia, the strategic implications of Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa, and Kissinger's belief in the need for a tacit division of global influence between the superpowers.

In this March 1978 conversation, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed rising US concerns over Soviet and Cuban military involvement in the Horn of Africa, particularly its perceived threat to Western oil routes and the stability of Saudi Arabia. Dobrynin rejected Brzezinski’s fears as exaggerated, reiterating that the conflict stemmed from Somali aggression and emphasizing that the Soviet presence supported Ethiopia's defense. The meeting ended with both sides restating their entrenched positions, with the US seeking assurances of de-escalation and Soviet withdrawal, which Dobrynin declined to provide.

In this January 1975 conversation, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with US Vice President Nelson Rockefeller and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to discuss the state of US-Soviet relations, focusing on discriminatory trade legislation, strategic arms negotiations, and the upcoming Brezhnev visit. Kissinger and Rockefeller expressed shared concerns over congressional interference in foreign policy and emphasized their commitment to preserving détente, while privately assuring Dobrynin that recent US threats of military intervention in the Middle East were strategic posturing to prevent another oil embargo. The meeting also highlighted US plans for long-term energy independence and efforts to sustain diplomatic momentum despite mounting domestic political challenges.

During a December 1974 conversation between Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Kissinger expressed frustration over the public release of a Soviet letter amid sensitive trade legislation in Congress. The discussion also covered U.S. and European coordination on the Pan-European Conference and ongoing Middle East negotiations, with Dobrynin warning that US unilateral actions risked undermining broader peace efforts and US-Soviet relations.

On April 28, 1975, Kissinger urgently informed the Soviet Union that North Vietnamese forces had begun shelling Saigon’s airport and the U.S. Embassy complex, killing two Marines and disrupting the evacuation, which he claimed violated an assumed two-week timeframe and risked forcing American military intervention. Ambassador Dobrynin dismissed Kissinger’s insinuations of Soviet involvement.

In an April 22, 1975 conversation, Henry Kissinger conveyed President Ford's concern to the Soviet Union about North Vietnamese troop movements near Saigon's airport, warning that any attempt to trap Americans could force US military intervention, while General Scowcroft clarified that Marines were positioned offshore for potential deployment but Ford preferred to avoid their use if possible.

Dobrynin presents a lengthy statement from Brezhnev to Nixon. Nixon, Kissinger, and Dobrynin subsequently discuss the conflict in the Middle East, Soviet-American relations, and transatlantic relations.

Nixon receives two Soviet academics. Afterwards, Nixon and Dobrynin discuss Brezhnev's latest letter to Nixon and Nixon's plans to "force" Israel to agree to a peace settlement. Dobrynin comments on Watergate.

Kissinger concedes to Dobrynin that the United States had made a "significant mistake when it rushed to introduce heightened combat readiness."

Dobrynin recounts several conversations with Nixon and Kissinger about Soviet-American relations and resolving the crisis in the Middle East.