Skip to content

Results:

1 - 7 of 7

Documents

March 14, 1953

Ciphered Telegram from Razuvaev to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai

Telegram from Razuvaev discussing POWs and what precedents established at the Geneva Conference must be met. Razuvaev also asks whether their side is ready for immediate repatriation of seriously ill and seriously wounded prisoners of UN troops.

January 28, 1950

The Military Commission Agrees to Allow the 4th Field Army's Ethnic Korean Officers and Soldiers Repatriate to Korea

Kim Il Sung will receive the ethnic Korean troops from Wuhan, China.

January 11, 1950

The Military Commission Agrees to Allow the 4th Field Army's Ethnic Korean Officers and Soldiers Repatriate to Korea

China asked three representatives from DPRK to prepare to receive the ethnic Korean troops.

January 22, 1950

Cable, Liu Shaoqi to Chairman Mao [Zedong]

Liu Shaoqi reports to Mao Zedong that the ethnic Korean officers have arrived to bring back the ethnic Koreans to Korea. To the request of the North Korean officers in bringing back the weapons ethnic Korean officers had used, Mao responds in the affirmative.

September 29, 1950

Telegram from Zhou Enlai to Ni Zhiliang

China approves of Kim Il Sung's request to build warehouses and factories in China and Korea and agrees to recruit Korean drivers for him in the northeast.

November 22, 1958

Record of Conversation from the Premier's Reception of the Korean Government Delegation

Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung discuss the economic situation, electricity production, agricultural production, cooperativization, and the military in North Korea, as well as the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Army from the DPRK. Zhou and Kim also touched on issues relating to U.S.-Japan relations, inter-Korean relations, Chinese development, the Great Leap Forward, U.S. global strategy, Korean nationals in Japan, and Taiwan.

April 5, 1962

Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry

Report from Hungarian Ambassador József Kovács on criticism of Soviet revisionism from within the Korean Workers' Party and the increase of institutional paranoia in North Korea, especially of foreigners and foreign-born Koreans.