Khrushchev reflects on the German question, emphasizing the realities of East and West Germany and the broader Cold War tensions surrounding their division. He discusses the Berlin Crisis, NATO’s role in maintaining geopolitical pressure, and the economic and political benefits of normalizing relations between the USSR and West Germany.

Khrushchev discusses the Soviet Union's new economic program and revolutionary history with Sudanese Prime Minister Ibrahim Abboud, emphasizing the USSR's achievements and its commitment to peaceful, cooperative relations with Sudan. He critiques Western imperialism and urges Sudan to allow Soviet aid flights to the Congo, arguing that supporting anti-colonial movements is a moral duty. The conversation also touches on Sudan's domestic policies, its cautious approach to socialism, and opportunities for expanded economic and technical cooperation between the two countries.

Bulganin proposes a halt on nuclear tests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom beginning on January 1, 1958.

Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

CIA Memorandum for President Truman on US position on Soviet actions in Berlin.

Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, reports on his meetings with US journalists and officials in Washington, DC. Especially significant was his 30 January meeting with President John F. Kennedy in which Kennedy compared the communist revolution in Cuba with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution suppressed by the Soviet Union. Adzhubei also described Kennedy's comments on German reunification.

The US National Security Council discusses the effect that Stalin’s death had on Soviet policy and on Communist Parties outside of the USSR, as well as the opportunity it provided the US to use Stalin’s death in a psychological strategy to influence the Soviets. The Council also discusses the possibility of negotiations for a settlement with the Soviets in Korea.