Hugh Richardson, head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, reports on the latest developments in Tibet's relations with India, China, the UK, and the US. He also comments on the Dalai Lama's studies and interests.

The Indian Mission in Lhasa reports on the Tibetan Government's attempts to engage the governments of India, the UK, and the US while it begins negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party.

In this document, N. S. Khrushchev provides wide-ranging comments on various geopolitical and diplomatic issues. He criticizes the US for holding onto outdated alliances like Taiwan, emphasizing the need to normalize relations and reduce tensions globally. Khrushchev discusses Middle Eastern instability, particularly in Iran, warning against U.S. interference and emphasizing self-determination for colonized nations. He also addresses disarmament, arguing that military bases are a source of tension and advocating for a phased withdrawal of troops and arms control measures. Additional topics include the complexities of summit diplomacy, Lend-Lease repayment disputes, and his correspondence with world leaders such as Macmillan, De Gaulle, and Nehru, stressing the importance of aligning messages to maintain good relations.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 26 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Liberia, Germanys, the Soviet Union, India, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

Despite new information that the Soviet Union was deploying anti-ballistic missile defenses around Moscow, the United States had not yet decided to deploy its own ABM defenses (although a decision would be made later in the year) and there was some hope that U.S.-Soviet talks would prevent an ABM race. If, however, talks failed, some NATO allies worried about the “adverse consequences” of an ABM race, especially whether having an ABM system might incline Washington toward risk taking.

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

Mao Zedong and Kissinger's meeting was aimed at establishing political relations between China and the United States. They discussed the following issues: U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the differences in ideology, Western German policy towards the Soviet Union, the amount of American overseas troops, the Vietnam War, trade barriers between two nations, Chinese-Japanese relations, and the historical issues between Germany and Britain during WWII.

Argentina, like its neighbor, Brazil, was determined to develop an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” with the capacity to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium. Also like Brazil, Argentina was one of the few Latin American countries to refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thus, Argentina’s nuclear activities were under routine scrutiny to see if they involved anything that suggested an interest in a weapons capability. US intelligence agencies continued to monitor developments but perspectives shifted as Argentina’s domestic politics evolved. Prepared after the Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands Islands, in which Washington helped London, this special estimate professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions. While “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.”

Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.

Laird has made four practical recommendations on how to proceed with French/US nuclear relations. Laird's four points involve information on nuclear effects simulator types, the sale of small simulators, general hardening technology, and/or ABM intelligence. The US has given as much technical assistance as possible thus far within the current guidelines, and it is up to the president to address the issues related to changes in policy to continue the assistance. He is urged to consider especially the impact such aid would have on relations with the UK and the Soviet Union, but we should not cut off all assistance while these issues are being addressed.