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Gyeongbokgung

East Asia

South Korea

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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Kuzbari, Zouheir

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A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin and the Cold War

Press Briefing by Permanent Observer of Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the UN, 7 July 1976.

Inter-Korean Relations

Photograph of the Hands of Victory Monument in Baghdad.

Middle East

Iraq

Dr. Syngman Rhee, 1939

Syngman Rhee Era

Saddam on the Phone in 1988

The Saddam Files

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Korea at the United Nations

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Narasimhan, C. V. (Chakravarthi V.)

1915 -

Photograph of Korean War armistice signing

Korean War Armistice

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Ozbudun, Ahmet H.

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Kofi Annan and Saddam Hussein

Hussein, Saddam

1937 - 2006

Kim Il Sung, 1978

Kim, Il Sung

1912 - 1994

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United States. Department of State

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1990	Meeting between Saddam and Iraqi Military Commanders to Discuss Preparations to Defend against Attacks by Colation Forces after the Gulf War This file contains the record of a meeting between Saddam and his military commanders on efforts to defend Iraq from any coalition attacks following the Gulf War. They discuss the UN inspection regime, the diplomatic panorama, the prospects for Russian support, and other issues. They argue that Iraq was stronger after the Gulf War than before.
May 1, 1991	Saddam Hussein and Military Officials Discussing the Condition of the Iraqi Army and Its Possible Enlargement This audio file from a meeting dated 1 May 1991 between Saddam Hussein and the General Command of the Army regarding the enlargement of the Army, the political changes which affect the Army and its training. Saddam Hussein admired the forming of the Republican Guards groups, soldeirs who participated in Qadissyah Saddam (Iran-Iraq War). In addition, this file includes a discussion regarding the invasion of Kuwait and the low morale of Iraqi soldiers, the American request to cease-fire because of the Iraqi soldiers' brevity, the gradual erosion of Iraqi morale on the front, and the increase of Divisions' numbers within the Army. Major General Sultan discussed the use of high-technology weapons by the American forces in the First Gulf War.
1993	93-Minute Audio File Details National Command Meeting with Saddam Hussein in 1993 Audio file details one of the Iraqi National Command's meetings. Saddam Hussein, who presided over the meeting, held sometime in 1993, stressed the importance of having the conference documents printed out and distributed to the members of the Ba'th Party. In the meeting, they talked about the following issues: The reports written out by the members of the Ba'th Party - Planning - The problems that face the National Command - The impact of the 1st Gulf War on the Arab world - Some issues of the Ba'th Party - The personality of the Ba'th Party members - How they can manage the universities to control the problems that face the youth - The chain of command of the Party Unions.
December 10, 1992	Michael Reilly (First Political Secretary, UK Embassy in Seoul) to Ian Bond (FCO Security Policy Department), '1992 US Burden Sharing Report' This document dates from the “lame duck” period of the George H.W. Bush administration, and centers on the renegotiating of the US defense position in on the peninsula. Amid pending changes in the early Clinton administration to burden sharing, the British were trying to pin down on what basis estimates of cost were being made on US Forces in Korea.
December 5, 1961	Report from Seán Ronan to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Irish Resolution on Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’ (Confidential), New York [Excerpt] Aiken drafted in additional personnel to the Irish Mission to the UN in the run-in to the XVIth UN Session. Seán Ronan, the head of the political and information divisions at headquarters in Dublin, was sent as a delegate to the First Committee of the UN, involving him intensely in Aiken’s non-dissemination efforts. His insider account reveals some of the dynamics and calculations at play in the building, as Ireland managed a balancing act of engineering consensus between East and West. In large part, the Irish Mission crafted the resolution’s language to skirt the issue of alliance nuclear sharing in a bid to manufacture unanimity. The Irish had pondered co-sponsoring a Swedish draft resolution but anticipated that it would face resistance from NATO comparable to earlier iterations of the Irish resolution. Similarly, Ireland neglected to mention a proposed new disarmament committee in the draft resolution – there was no guarantee that it would form and report expeditiously. Finally, by drawing on the instrument of acclamation, the Irish sidestepped French objections and gained universal approval for Resolution 1665 (1961), wrapping the resolution in universal legitimacy.
June 26, 1959	Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin) Boland gauged opinion at the UN and assisted in preparing the ground for Aiken’s campaign in the XIVth Session in the fall of 1959. Ireland cultivated the UN Secretariat, notably Dr. Protitch, who evaluated the Irish proposal as helpful. Likewise, intimations from the Eastern bloc were positive. The Irish Permanent Representative consolidated links with the second-in-command of the U.S. mission to the UN, James W. Barco, to enable a constructive dialogue with the Americans to fashion a resolution they could tolerate
April 10, 1963	American Embassy Paris Telegram 4136 to the Secretary of State, Washington, DC A SHAPE news release would announce the “courtesy call” by the Polaris submarine, U.S.S. Sam Houston, to Iszmir, Turkey, beginning on April 14. The visit will “provide an opportunity for distinguished Turkish officials to view this latest weapon system to be assigned to the defense of Allied Command Europe.”
March 28, 1963	American Embassy Rome Airgram A-1368 to State Department, 'Exchange of Notes Affecting Replacement of Jupiter Missiles in Italy' On March 22, 1963, through an exchange of notes, the U.S. and Italy confirmed the final agreement on the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles and their replacement with patrols of Polaris submarines assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The Polaris patrols would begin on April 1, 1963, and the dismantling operation would occur during the next 25 days.
February 15, 1963	Department of State Telegram 1150 to the American Embassy Paris To bring NATO officially on board, the State Department sent this draft paper to U.S. ambassadors in Italy, NATO, and Turkey for use with the North Atlantic Council and with SACEUR. Just as the three governments had informed the Council of the Jupiter deployment plans in the late 1950s, they would brief the NAC on the purposes of the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement and its military implications, including retargeting requirements for the “timely damage” of Allied Command Europe targets.
December 27, 1962	JCS Telegram 7947 to USCINCEUR [Commander-in-Chief European Command], CINCLANT [Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command] and DSTP [Director Strategic Target Planning Staff], Offutt Air Force Base, Info for CINCSAC [Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command] This urgent message “of the highest sensitivity” from the Joint Chiefs to top commanders began with a misrepresentation of President Kennedy’s decision: “serious consideration [is] being given to withdrawal of JUPITERS from Italy and Turkey.” The recipients—General Lyman Lemnitzer [CINCEUR], Admiral Robert Dennison [CINCLANT], and General Thomas Power [DSTP]—were to assume that Italy and Turkey had agreed to the decision, that withdrawal of the Jupiters would occur by April 1, 1963, and that Polaris submarines would be in the Mediterranean by that date. Both USCINCEUR and DSTP, who directed work on the SIOP, were to consider retargeting requirements once the Jupiters went offline. CINCLANT was to consider the feasibility of deploying one, two, or three submarines.