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1977

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 14, Moscow, 1977, 240 pp.

The table of contents for volume 14 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to  the theory of counterintelligence activities, management of counterintelligence activities, sociology and operational psychology, West German intelligence, and "adversary" activities at sea, in propaganda, and in the mapping of Soviet territory.

1977

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 13, Moscow, 1977, 238 pp.

The table of contents for volume 13 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the theory of counterintelligence activities, management of counterintelligence activities, adversary capabilities in air and space, and education and training, among other topics.

1976

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 11, Moscow, 1976, 256 pp.

The table of contents for volume 11 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to theory, organization, and tactics of counterintelligence, the "subversive activities" of the United States and other countries, criminology, and other subjects.

1975

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 09, Moscow, 1975, 315 pp.

The table of contents for volume 9 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the theory and practice of counterintelligence, the history of Soviet state security organizations, training and education,  and  the "subversive activities of the adversary."

1974

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 08, Moscow, 1974, 210 pp.

The table of contents for volume 8 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the so-called "subversive activities of Zionists".

1974

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 07, Moscow, 1974, 195 pp.

The table of contents for volume 7 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to intelligence services of the "imperialist states" and adversaries, including the United States, West Germany, and Israel.

April 1, 1949

Letter, Jawaharlal Nehru to All Provincial Premiers

Nehru briefs the Provincial Premiers about internal and external developments. Nehru highlights the situation in China and states that the communists could soon take power in the whole of China. He speculates how this will affect other regions.

July 30, 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, on the sidelines of the NATO Summit in Madrid on 8 July 1997

Kohl and Kuchma debate plans for the establishment of a permanent German-Ukrainian commission. Kohl emphasizes  Ukraine's relevance in terms of European security.

March 14, 1961

Memorandum to All Missions by the Department of External Affairs, ‘Arms Control’ (Confidential) (408/264B), Dublin

The arrival of the new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, in office in 1961 encouraged Aiken to redouble his efforts. He searched for signs of change in the Kennedy administration. He was nevertheless guarded,  appreciating that the arms control ambitions of the United States did not necessarily or completely align with Ireland’s disarmament aspirations. He understood that progress required educating public opinion to recognize that general and complete disarmament could, given the vested interests, take generations. A step-by-step, gradualist approach therefore had to be adopted. He reiterated his philosophy of expanding areas of law, adopting a regionalist approach, and assuming a preventive orientation in a commentary on Kennedy’s article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in November 1960, which was itself based on Kennedy's campaign speech earlier that year.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

Pagination