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October 13, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 13 October 1973'

Dobrynin and Kissinger review the situation in the Middle East and the impact of the Arab-Israeli war on Soviet-American relations.

October 13, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 13 October 1973'

Ambassador Dobrynin passes a message from Brezhnev about the Arab-Israeli war to Nixon and Kissinger.

October 12, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 12 October 1973'

Kissinger and Dobrynin discuss the roles of China and Great Britain in the Middle East conflict. Kissinger says the United States has intelligence suggesting that Soviet armed forces will intervene in the war. Dobrynin accuses Israel of "barbaric" behavior in the conflict.

October 10, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 10 October 1973'

Dobrynin conveys the latest Soviet position on the Arab-Israeli war to Kissinger. He says that the Soviet Union supports the Arab countries in their "just struggle" but also that the United States and USSR should work together to achieve a ceasefire.

October 9, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 9 October 1973'

During two conversations, Kissinger accuses the Soviet Union of urging Jordan to join the war against Israel. Dobrynin believes that Nixon and Kissinger are "clearly nervous" and suggests that the United States could decide to directly intervene in the Arab-Israeli war.

October 6, 1973

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with US Secretary of State H. Kissinger, 6 October 1973'

Dobrynin summarizes two conversations with Henry Kissinger about the conflict between Israel and Egypt and Syria. Kissinger claims that the Soviet Union knew in advance of the Arab intention to go to war.

August 2, 1958

Third Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, August 2, 1958, in Fengziyuan

Mao and Khrushchev have a conversation about about international affairs, including NATO, CENTO, and SEATO, relations with the USA and Japan, and the situation in the Near East. They also expressed their views on the situation in Latin America, and preparations for a third world war. According to the Soviet record of the conversation, they also discussed domestic problems in the two countries. Specifically, Mao spoke at length to Khrushchev about the successes of the Great Leap.

August 1, 1958

Second Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, August 1, 1958, in Zhongnanhai

On this second day of the talks, international affairs were the main topic of conversation. From the Soviet record, which like those of the first and the next discussion, was made by Fedorenko and the third secretary of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anatolii I. Filyov, it is evident that the atmosphere was fully relaxed, anti-imperialism brought the communist leaders together. Both hated America, Great Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and their leaders. They discussed the situation in the Near East in detail and were heartened by the victory of leftist forces in Iraq. They joked a lot. And only at the end did Mao lightly touch upon his claims to Khrushchev, who at once reminded the Chinese leader of the Soviet advisors. It was obvious that this question continued to bother him, and Khrushchev exacerbated his grievance.

September 2, 1947

Confidential Report No. 6594 from the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow to the Foreign Minister

A 25-page report sent by the Romanian Ambassador in Moscow, Iorgu Iordan, regarding Soviet perceptions of the Marshall Plan and a synthesis of life in Soviet Union as reflected in the media.

July 7, 1947

Letter, Office of the British Political Representative, Bucharest, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Gh. Tatarescu

A message from the British Representative, Adrian Holman, addressed on July 7 to Minister Tatarescu as “personal and confidential." In five points, Holman essentially offer a rebuttal of Soviet criticisms to Marshall Plan.

Pagination