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September 23, 1966	Adrian Fisher, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Hays Redmon, Staff Assistant to the President, enclosing 'Summary of Recent Soviet "Signals" on Non-Proliferation' In this report, ACDA Deputy Director Adrian Fisher summarizes Moscow's growing interest in reaching a final agreement on an NPT, in part because of its recognition of “pressures growing in third countries for development of nuclear capabilities.”
July 11, 1966	Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson to the Secretary of State, 'Comments on the Proposed Revision of the Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty,' with enclosures In this memorandum, McNamara, Rusk, and Adrian Fisher discuss amendments and language of the NPT treaty that was in stalemate that summer. Fisher saw the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, with its prohibition of the “transfer of atomic weapons to any other country,” as providing model language for an NPT because it was compatible with the bilateral agreements.
July 1, 1966	Memorandum of Conversation between William C. Foster, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Karl Carstens, State Secretary at the West German Foreign Office, 'Disarmament and Related Problems' In this conversation, West German State Secretary Karl Carstens told ACDA director William C. Foster that Bonn was still committed to a “hardware” solution, “if not in the form of an MLF than in some form.” Refraining from making any commitment, Foster wanted to leave the question “open.”
April 28, 1966	National Intelligence Estimate 23-66, 'West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons,' excised copy This NIE estimated that within two years Bonn could produce enough fissile material to produce a nuclear weapon, but only by violating safeguards on its nuclear facilities.The estimators, nevertheless, believed that Bonn “will probably want to keep open what options it has for the eventual production of nuclear weapons.”
March 9, 1966	Department of State Airgram A-168 to US Embassy West Germany, 'NIE 23-66: West German Capabilities and Intentions to Produce and Deploy Nuclear Weapons' At the request of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the agencies that belonged to the U.S. Intelligence Board began work on a National Intelligence Estimate to provide a “comprehensive analysis” of West German nuclear “capabilities and intentions.” In this Airgram, the State Department requested input from the Bonn embassy on the upcoming NIE.
November 1, 1965	Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary, 'Dobrynin’s October 29 Oral Statement on Nonproliferation' In this report, the INR commented on Soviet policy language regarding nuclear proliferation. They called Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin's criticism of MLF proposals "absurd," telling Secretary Rusk that “in no way can we be blamed for taking steps which even with a most fault-finding approach would look like disseminating nuclear weapons."
October 27, 1965	'The Danger from a Psychotic Germany,' Appendix to 'The Case for a Strong American Lead to Establish a Collective Nuclear System That Would Help the Western World from Repeating an Old Mistake,' attached to George W. Ball to Secretary Rusk, et al. Under Secretary George W. Ball signed off on a fervent expression of his apprehensions about the direction of West German policy should the West fail to establish an MLF leading Bonn to feel “rejection and discrimination.” Ball saw three bad possibilities: a national nuclear program, a French-German nuclear deal, or “the real danger, a German political adventure.”
October 23, 1965	Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Rusk and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Winiewicz, 'Security, Non-Proliferation and the German Problem' This wide-ranging discussion between Rusk and Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz on European security, nuclear weapons, and the problem of German reunification illuminated U.S. and Polish concerns about the future of Germany.
October 20, 1965	US Embassy to West Germany, Memorandum, 'German Attitudes on Nuclear Defense Questions' In this memorandum, an unnamed official at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn analyzed various West German nuclear and non-nuclear alternatives in the event of failure of the proposals for collective nuclear defense arrangements. An independent nuclear capability was ruled out as an alternative because “no responsible political leader in Germany of any party, any known private group, or any discernible body of Garman opinion … considers it desirable.”
July 9, 1965	State Department Policy Planning Staff, 'S/P Consultants Discussion of Atlantic Affairs' with Cover memorandum from Walt Rostow to Secretary of Defense McNamara In this meeting between members of the Policy Planning Staff's board of consultants, the participants discussed their policy preferences towards European nuclear arrangements. Recognizing “bitter” French and Soviet objections to a collective nuclear force, the consultants believed that over time it might be possible to “get both the force and the agreement.”

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Indian Nuclear History 226

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