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September 23, 1961

Letter, William Rayman to Richard Reuter, Executive Director of the Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere (CARE)

William Rayman’s letter to Richard Reuter not only reflects the swiftness with which CARE established its presence in Sierra Leone but also showcases its ability to tailor programs to align with the desires of several stakeholders. 

December 28, 1948

Letter, Paul Comly French, Executive Director of CARE, to President Truman

An unusual request reached President Truman’s desk in December 1948. It was written by the executive director of CARE, the humanitarian agency responsible for getting food aid to Europeans in the wake of World War II. 

November 30, 1945

Letter from Clarence E. Pickett, Executive Director of the American Friends Service Committee and Chair of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service to Hanns Gramm

In a letter to Hanns Gramm, a member of the Board of Directors at the American Friends Service Committee, Clarence E. Pickett describes the establishment of an organization called the Cooperative America for Remittances to Europe (CARE).

December 2, 1958

Letter from Con Cremi to Frederick H. Boland (New York) (Personal and Confidential) (Copy), Dublin [Excerpt]

Aiken’s advocacy of consecutive “non-dissemination” resolutions on an annual basis was inspired by his affinity for the “art of the possible,” namely a belief that small, concrete steps would ameliorate international tensions.

April 24, 1968

Extracts from a Memorandum for the Information of the Government by the Department of External Affairs, ‘The General Assembly of the United Nations (Resumed Twenty-second Session’ (417/289), Dublin

The view of Frank Aiken throughout the 1960s was that once the United States and the Soviet Union had come to a basic agreement on the treaty, it was in the interests of all states to sign it on the basis of enlightened self-interest. He was not in favor of delay to finalize agreement on finer points as the will of the superpowers was of paramount importance.

November 13, 1964

Extract from Memo. for Govt. dated 13/11/1964, 19th Session of U.N. General Assembly: 'III. Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons'

This memorandum for Cabinet succinctly summarizes Aiken’s approach after 1961. He supported the negotiations of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) but recognized and held to the position that Resolution 1665 (XIV) provided the basic roadmap for an eventual agreement of a global non-proliferation treaty. More specifically, he maintained that 1665 provided the basis by which NATO nuclear sharing could be accommodated. Aiken was skeptical of Soviet contentions that a non-proliferation pact would prevent the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF). The Irish position was that it would not engage in the detailed ENDC discussions as it was for that body and the nuclear powers to broker the detailed provisions for an NPT owing to their knowledge of, and interests in, nuclear energy.

December 5, 1961

Report from Seán Ronan to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Irish Resolution on Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’ (Confidential), New York [Excerpt]

Aiken drafted in additional personnel to the Irish Mission to the UN in the run-in to the XVIth UN Session. Seán Ronan, the head of the political and information divisions at headquarters in Dublin, was sent as a delegate to the First Committee of the UN, involving him intensely in Aiken’s non-dissemination efforts. His insider account reveals some of the dynamics and calculations at play in the building, as Ireland managed a balancing act of engineering consensus between East and West. In large part, the Irish Mission crafted the resolution’s language to skirt the issue of alliance nuclear sharing in a bid to manufacture unanimity. The Irish had pondered co-sponsoring a Swedish draft resolution but anticipated that it would face resistance from NATO comparable to earlier iterations of the Irish resolution. Similarly, Ireland neglected to mention a proposed new disarmament committee in the draft resolution – there was no guarantee that it would form and report expeditiously. Finally, by drawing on the instrument of acclamation, the Irish sidestepped French objections and gained universal approval for Resolution 1665 (1961), wrapping the resolution in universal legitimacy. 

January 5, 1961

Seán MacEntee, 'Nuclear Weapons: Proposed Declaration. Statement from the Minister for Health'

Frank Aiken was primarily responsible for originating the non-proliferation concept in 1958. He propelled the campaign with a heavy personal investment of time and energy in it. Although a senior and longstanding member of the Fianna Fáil government, closely aligned with the party’s elder statesman Eamon de Valera, his non-proliferation initiative was not immune from senior internal criticism. Seán MacEntee was another Fianna Fáil veteran and occupied the position of Tánaiste (deputy prime minister) from 1959. He formulated a cogent critique of Aiken’s non-dissemination designs in January 1961 that foreshadowed later criticisms of the NPT. MacEntee’s observations were pertinent to the constitutionalization of nuclear non-proliferation, and posed fundamental questions about national sovereignty, inequality, real politik, and implementation as Aiken entered his fourth year of advocacy for a treaty based on the Irish resolutions. Aiken had encountered such criticisms already and was relatively unperturbed. He overcame this divergent voice in the Cabinet to continue his efforts and persuade the incoming John F Kennedy Administration to support the drive for an NPT later that year.

September 16, 1968

Otto Hauber, 'Note requested by the Federal Chancellor regarding the consequences of a potential German non-signing of the NP [Non-Proliferation] Treaty'

At Ruete’s request, an additional assessment of what could happen if West Germany did not sign the NPT was prepared by a specialist from the Commissioner’s subdivision in the Foreign Office, Otto Hauber, who coordinated it with other officials in the ministry. As Hauber told Ruete, his “political evaluation” differed from those of the three Ambassadors and it was impossible to find a “common denominator”

September 6, 1968

Report No. 597 from Swidbert Schnippenkötter, Geneva

In a telex he sent Geneva, Schnippenkötter estimated that “negative consequences” of not signing the NPT would be “objectively low, but stronger in the atmospheric”. For the Soviets, the NPT was “no condition sine qua non” for commencing negotiations on strategic nuclear arms; in the United States, there would be “a certain annoyance” among Democrats but that would be all.

Pagination