Throughout the 1950s, Yugoslav nuclear policy was designed by President Tito and a small circle of his closest associates. Very few official documents from that time remain or indeed ever existed. Things began to change after the establishment of the UN Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in December 1961, followed by the committee’s first meeting in March 1962, which marked the beginning of global negotiations that eventually led to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. This initiative forced the Yugoslav political leadership to approach the problem more systematically. 

The short document presented here comes from the first meeting during which the Yugoslav nuclear policy started to be officially formulated. The meeting was organized by the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs [Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove — DSIP] and included representatives of the Yugoslav People’s Army [Jugoslovenska narodna armija — JNA], the Institute for International Politics [Institut za međunarodnu politiku] and the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission [Savezna komisija za nuklearnu energiju — SKNE]. The main goal was to initiate the coordination of activities and permanent consultations between these institutions in order to provide expert support to the DSIP and better comprehension of the ongoing negotiations in the ENDC.

The view of Frank Aiken throughout the 1960s was that once the United States and the Soviet Union had come to a basic agreement on the treaty, it was in the interests of all states to sign it on the basis of enlightened self-interest. He was not in favor of delay to finalize agreement on finer points as the will of the superpowers was of paramount importance.

A report produced by the Czechoslovak foreign ministry in August 1963 recommending the ratification of Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).  One of the key goals of early Czechoslovak engagement in the ENDC was to reject a nuclear test ban, based on their rejection of any verification measures. However, once the Soviets agreed to the LTBT with the US and the United Kingdom, the Czechoslovak foreign ministry praised the agreement and attacked those (such as China) who resisted the measure. One interesting aspect of the treaty was the proposed role of depositary powers. The document indicates that the Soviets were interested in being a depositary power to the LTBT in order to prevent ratification by governments not recognized by the USSR, most notably West Germany and the Republic of China. The issue of depositary powers reappeared later on, in the NPT as well.

Premier Zhou and Chen Yi answer questions from reporters in Cairo. Zhou and Chen were asked about issues such as their visit to Arab and African countries, China's support for national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Sri Lanka's perspective of the Sino-Indian border conflict, the purpose of the Chinese delegation's visit to Arab and African countries, issues that will be discussed in potential second Bandung Conference, the Sino-Soviet split, and the Pakistani national movement. Zhou also explains why China opposed the ban on nuclear test treaty.

The Japanese Foreign Ministry plans to convey its views on the proposed nuclear non-prolfieration treaty to the United States, particularly its concerns about how it might affect the US-Japan security alliance and the balance between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.

U Thant and Nikita Khrushchev met on August 5, 1963, to discuss the upcoming signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and broader disarmament efforts. They exchanged views on the role of the UN, non-nuclear zones, and the potential for future peace initiatives.

Nikita Khrushchev, Indira Gandhi, and T.N. Kaul discuss the Sino-Indian border conflict, emphasizing the challenges of pursuing negotiations amid domestic pressures. They also address Indo-Soviet relations, India’s non-alignment policy, the upcoming nuclear test ban treaty, and Khrushchev’s reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis as a lesson in preserving peace.

Khrushchev meets with and answers questions from an Iraqi Peace Delegation, including strategies for preventing war in the Middle East, the suspension of nuclear weapons testing, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, current situations in Algeria, Yemen, Oman, and Iran, and the possibility of the Soviet Union building a pilot hospital in Baghdad.

Analysis of the recent Chinese nuclear weapon test and it's strategic implications for China's diplomatic and military policies.

Homi Bhabha writes to Prime Minister Nehru to convey that the Chinese nuclear test will be of no military significance and Chinese possession of a few bombs will not make any difference to the military situation. In order to counter the Chinese bomb’s psychological-political impact, Dr. Bhabha argues that India needs to be in a position to produce the bomb within few months.