Cable No. 8894, Foreign Minister [Sosuke Uno] to the Ambassador in Britain et al, 'The Chinese Student Demonstrations'

Confidential

Indefinite Duration

No. 048908-019 to Diplomatic Missions

Received: May 26, 1989, 17:50:25

Draft Telegram

Primary: Director, China Division; cc: Director-General Asian Affairs Bureau, Deputy Director-General, [illegible handwriting]

Telegram Section: 1 [signed]  2 [signed]

Drafted: May 25, 1989

Drafter: Kohara [小原]; Telephone number: 2426

From: The Foreign Minister

To: Ambassadors in Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Soviet Union, United States, Republic of Korea, China, ASEAN, NY, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Guangzhou, [and] Shenyang

Subject: The Chinese Student Demonstrations

Primary: Asian Affairs, China

Joint No. 8894 Urgent Priority Handling

Pattern Code: [blacked out]

1. Our side continues to watch this matter with great interest. A summary of the current situation, background, and noteworthy points (as of the 25th) is as follows. Please refer as appropriate to this information in discussions with government officials and members of the diplomatic corps in your country of assignment.

[attachment follows]

Confidential

Indefinite Duration

(1) Background and Current Situation

China’s student demonstrations, which started with the death of former general secretary Hu Yaobang, grew with the imposition of martial law on the 20th and the advance of the People’s Liberation Army to the outskirts of Beijing. Amid growing tensions, the sit-in in the square in front of Tiananmen Square and the confrontation on the outskirts of the city between students and others against troops continue, but so far the possibility of armed suppression by the military is seen as having diminished. Thus, one can say that the focus has shifted from the square in front of Tiananmen Square, where students and others are continuing their sit-in, to Zhongnanhai, where there is seen taking place a power struggle among party and government leaders over bringing the demonstrations under control. It seems that opposing groups are still attacking one another, but the group represented by Li Peng is seen as consolidating its position.

(2) Background to the Demonstrations

(a) One can say that student dissatisfaction regarding lagging democratization and popular anger against the hardships due to inflation since last year and cadre corruption and injustice became a force and appeared as demonstrations, but their undercurrent is thought to be the popular and deep-rooted dissatisfaction regarding Deng Xiaoping’s longstanding “dictatorship.”

(b) On the other hand, there was a lack of understanding on the part of the present leadership in regard to the growth in this student and popular dissatisfaction. The authorities were unable to anticipate that the initial student demonstrations would gain the support of the common people and show such a great upsurge. One can point as well to their terribly inept response to it.   

(3) Noteworthy Points

(a) General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s Moves

Zhao Ziyang, who adopted a flexible response to the student demonstrations, has probably lost his authority but seems, at least, still to be in the position of general secretary. With Li Peng and the group supporting him gaining dominance, what happens to Zhao’s position will be a major point in predicting the direction that democratization and reform and opening will take. Should Zhao follow Hu in falling from power, there will be major damage internationally as well to the leadership’s image and, whether by intention or not, a slowdown in opening and reform may be unavoidable.

(b) Decline in Party’s Prestige

Behind these demonstrations developing beyond the anticipation of the present leadership, to the point of their imposing martial law, is the lack of recognition on the part of the authorities regarding the democratization movement and such, as well as the ineptness of their response at each critical juncture. This raises the question of whether it will really be possible for the Communist Party within its existing framework to absorb the will of the people. At this rate, there is concern that the Party’s foundation will grow increasingly unstable. Also, these demonstrations have exposed the magnitude of popular dissatisfaction in regard to Deng Xiaoping. One can say that this demonstrates that the time has come when Deng’s way until now of overcoming difficulties by his charisma no longer applies. With an eye on what comes after Deng, there will be a need to seriously undertake the party’s revitalization.

(c) Policy of Reform and Opening

No matter how these demonstrations develop, the basic direction of “reform and opening” is unlikely to change, but there is no denying that party and government leadership will deteriorate. The worry is that in the short term it will slow down or stagnate. In particular, such negative effects on economic exchanges as reduced investment would not be at all surprising.

(d) Spiritual Leaders of the Student Demonstrations

These demonstrations have been surprisingly controlled and extremely orderly. This suggests the existence of “spiritual leaders” of the students behind the demonstrations. On the other hand, from the leadership’s point of view, in dividing the students and the people, they may seek to bring the situation under control by presenting these demonstrations as caused by a few instigators, exposing those “behind-the-scene masterminds,” and calling for “stability and unity.”

[Handwritten paragraph] 2. Furthermore, for your reference, I gave answers on the 24th in the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Diet House of Representatives to the effect that, “The Government of Japan is concerned about the present situation in China and will continue to monitor the situation” and “We look forward to an amicable settlement of the situation.”

(Cable addresses) China, United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, Republic of Korea, ASEAN, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, NY

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