TO S. V. STEPASHIN,
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON
DEFENSE AND SECURITY QUESTIONS
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
[Russian Federation General
Staff letterhead]
Main Intelligence Directorate
8 June 1993
Nº 313/14/154
Dear Sergey Vadimovich!
At your request I am sending [you] a memo on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet.
Sincerely,
CHIEF OF THE MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF
General-Colonel
[signature] F. Ladygin
MEMO
on the problem of the Black Sea Fleet
With the formation of independent states on the territory of the former USSR one of the most acute of the problems in Russian-Ukrainian relations is that of the Black Sea Fleet, the unresolved status of which substantially affects the interests of the regional security of both countries in the Black Sea basin and might grow into a dangerous source of tension between Russia and Ukraine.
With the proclamation of the status of a sovereign, independent state Ukraine considers that it has received the complete legal right to a considerable part of the Black Sea coast, including the Crimean Peninsula. Practically the entire coastal infrastructure of the basing of the men and equipment of the Black Sea Fleet thereby transfers to its jurisdiction, including the most developed and trained naval base at Sevastopol’.
The 3 August 1992 Yalta Agreement signed by the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine establishes only the fact of the necessity of a division of and the procedure for the activity of the Black Sea Fleet during a transitional period until 1995. In accordance with this agreement the Black Sea Fleet was removed from the OVS SNG and directly subordinated to the Presidents of both republics. It was established that during the transitional period it would be manned in equal proportion, 50% from each country. In addition, it was stipulated that both countries will jointly use the existing system of basing and material and technical support.
[Translator’s note: an arrow in the left margin points to the beginning of the following paragraph]. At the same time quotas were not set by the Agreement which Russia and Ukraine could be entitled. As a result, immediately after its signing differences were revealed about the mechanism for dividing the Fleet. Russia, viewing the Black Sea Fleet separately from the Navy of the former USSR, declared its claim to 2/3 of its structure. Ukraine considers that it is part of the Navy of the former Soviet Union and therefore it has the right to the formations, ships, and infrastructure located on the territory of the republic. In the opinion of the Ukrainian side in negotiations about the division of the Fleet the discussion can only be about the ships, given that the bases and all the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet should belong to Ukraine and can be used by Russia only on an agreed basis. With such an approach more than 90% of all the men and equipment of the Fleet should belong to Ukraine.
The practical activity of the Ukrainian leadership is directed at dragging out the negotiations to determine the status of the Black Sea Fleet and a solution of the specific questions of supporting its vital activity. The uncertainty of the status of the Fleet and of the problem of dual citizenship in Crimea, the agitation pressure on sailors with the goal of inclining them to take the Ukrainian oath, attempts by the Ministry of Defense and the leadership of the Ukrainian Navy to unilaterally resubordinate formations, units, and institutions of the Fleet to themselves have destabilized the situation and increased tension in military collectives.
Considering that the Black Sea Fleet is an element of the balance of forces in the region and part of a military system of containment, and also has great importance for the security of Russia it is necessary as soon as possible to determine ways with Ukraine to solve the problems which have been created. When this is done [we] ought to proceed from the position that the presence in the Black Sea of a powerful Russian fleet is a sort of counterweight to the growing military might of Turkey and attempts by NATO countries to gain a foothold in this region on a permanent basis.
[Translator’s note: the following paragraph was highlighted in the left margin] Considering these factors Russia should insist in the most vigorous fashion on the preservation and joint use of all the infrastructure necessary for the basing and support of the activity of the men and equipment of the Fleet, naval aviation, the command system, and the repair of ships.
In the event the Ukrainian leadership does not agree with such an alternative, as a level of influence the question might be raised of the lawfulness of including Crimea in Ukraine on the basis of the 1954 USSR Supreme Soviet decree. In addition, the fact [inserted by hand: ought to be noted] that Ukraine is not capable of independently supporting the vital activity of the Black Sea Fleet (at the present time the extent of Russian supplies to the Fleet in weapons and ammunition is 95%, of fuel, 85%, and spare parts, 80%) might be used as pressure on Kiev.
At the same time it would be advisable to step up Russia’s activity through diplomatic channels to explain its position on this question to the international community and the possible dangerous consequences for Russian-Ukrainian relations and the preservation of a stable situation in the region of the Ukrainian side dragging out or wrecking a solution to the problems of the Black Sea Fleet.