CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE BLACK SEA FLEET
(analytical note)
The situation in the Black Sea Fleet (ChF) itself and around it has recently become sharply aggravated. Protesting the unilateral acts of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Navy command, often bordering on direct provocations, by the present time more than 300 auxiliary ships have raised the Andreyev flag, thereby declaring their desire to transfer exclusively to the authority of Russia. Rallies of large numbers of people, picketing, and demonstrations have been constantly going on in the hero city of Sevastopol’, which has served as the main base of the ChF, and other cities of Crimea where the ships of the Fleet are based, for more than two months already. On 3 June a one-hour warning strike was held at enterprises of the city. At the same time a collection of food and clothing was begun for the crews of the ships which raised the Andreyev flag inasmuch as all of them were removed from all kinds of allowances by order of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on 20 May.
The echo of events in the ChF and around it has already rolled into Moscow. On 3 June parties and organizations in the National Salvation Front held mass picketing at the RF Supreme Soviet building. The picketers not only expressed themselves in support of the Black Sea sailors, but also protested that the decisions of the 12th Congress of People’s Deputies on this problem were not being observed. The same day the question of the situation of the ChF was raised by People’s Deputy N. A. Pavlov at a session of the Supreme Soviet.
The main legal document determining the current status of the ChF and the status of the servicemen serving in this Fleet remains “The Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine About the Principles of the Formation of the Russian Navy and the Ukrainian Navy Based on the Black Sea Fleet of the Former USSR*, signed by RF President B. N. Yel’tsin and President of Ukraine L. M. Kravchuk in Yalta on 3 August 1992 (henceforth, the Yalta Agreement). The document records the parties’ agreement that during a transitional period set as until 1995 inclusively, Until its division between the parties the Black Sea Fleet will be directly subordinate to the Presidents of the RF and Ukraine, who appoint the joint command of the ChF by consensus; it will be manned by conscripts of Russia and Ukraine in equal proportion (50 percent each); the conscripts take an oath to the country of which they are citizens. Article 9 of the Agreement provides that the contracting parties ensure the civil, political, economic, and social rights of the servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet who are in the Russian or Ukrainian Navy according to their desire, and also the people discharged from military service and their family members in accordance with the legislation of the contracting parties on the territory of which they serve, and taking into consideration the 14 February 1992 agreement between the member states of the SNG [Commonwealth of Independent States] about the social and legal guarantees of the servicemen and people discharged from military service and their family members. The Agreement also especially stipulates that the joint use of the existing system of basing and material and technical supply by the contracting parties is done with due respect for the legislation of the contracting parties and without interference in the internal affairs of one another. When this is done any statement or other action of an official directed at interference in the internal affairs of a contracting party entails the adoption of appropriate measures (Article 10).
It was contemplated that the principles of the formation of the fleets of Russia and Ukraine based on the ChF were to be specified by the Agreement in individual agreements; however, it was especially stipulated that the drafts of such agreements should be prepared by 1 October 1992.
However, from the very beginning the Yalta Agreement became a kind of bone in the throat of the freshly-minted Ukrainian military elite [nomenklatura] and militant nationalists, who at the time of the signing of the agreement had already about 200 candidates prepared to be made Ukrainian generals and admirals. Not without reason, with the ink still not dry on the Yalta Agreement, the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense began a campaign to discredit the agreements reached in Yalta, declaring them “a betrayal of the interests of the Ukrainian people”. A course was plotted at a forced rupture of the negotiations process and, as Minister of Defense of Ukraine K. Morozov himself expressed it, toward “the withdrawal of all foreign troops from our own territory”. As a result no specific agreements about the status of the ChF for the transitional period, the status of Sevastopol’, and the other bases of the Fleet in the Crimea, or the status of servicemen were reached either by 1 October 1992 nor by any other deadline and there are none.
Having wrecked the negotiating process with the Russian side the leadership of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense at the same time, per the example of the Baltic countries, began to carry out a “tactic of forcing out the Russkies” literally a week after the signing of the Yalta Agreement, a tactic of seizing and resubordinating units, formations, institutions, and organizations of the ChF to themselves. Beginning on 10 August of last year the Ukrainian side, as they say, seized most of the repair base, depots, plants, training, and educational institutions of the ChF “on the sly”. Beginning 6 March 1993 by order to K. Morozov all ships of the auxiliary fleet were declared Ukrainian property. At meetings of officers who had taken the Ukrainian oath organized by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and nationalist organizations demands were advanced to denounce the Yalta Agreement and discharge all officers of the ChF into the reserve who had refused a passport with the “trident” stamp before the resolution of the question of the citizenship of servicemen at the political level. The campaign of intimidation of ChF servicemen increases with each day. The telegram of the chief of finance of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which dictated that ChF officers discharged on pension return to the treasury the amount “of all kinds of allowances received with violation of the laws of Ukraine”, that is, the currency conversion difference of the ruble to the coupon, by the way reduced (a total of 1.9) which Russia pays to sailors, produced an extremely pained reaction.
The unceasing provocation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine has led to the current upheaval. After as a result of the “explanatory work” by B. Kozhin, the Commander of the Ukrainian Navy, on 15 May fireboat PZhK-38 raised the “yellow-and-blue” flag, thereby transferring to the jurisdiction of Ukraine, and leaving combat duty for the first time in the history of the ChF, and then on order of Captain V. Musiyenko it was hijacked and taken from Ochakov to the island of Maysky; on 18 May auxiliary ships of the 171st Divizion of Support Ships of the Crimean Naval Base in Donuzlav and Sevastopol’ raised Andreyev flags in response to the actions of the Ukrainian command. Their example was soon followed by other units and formations of the ChF. The situation in the Fleet was so aggravated that some ChF officers do not exclude the possibility of bloodshed.
The current confrontation evidently might be smoothed out by only one method – a legal settlement of the problems of the ChF at the intergovernmental, international level. In the Russian MFA as well as the Ukrainian MFA all hopes are connected right now with a new meeting of the presidents of the two republics. It is specifically to prepare for such a meeting that Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Kozyrev flew to Kiev on 4 June. He did not manage to achieve anything significant. The date of a possible meeting between B. Yel’tsin and L. Kravchuk has not yet been agreed.
Speaking of such a meeting, one can not ignore two facts.
First. The positions of their presidents is not so firm right now even in their own countries that they could go into negotiations on the ChF, as they say, “from a position of strength”. Kiev is undergoing the latest political crisis. But in Moscow B. Yel’tsin will hardly deal with anything else in the next few days except a constitutional conference he convened, especially after the provocation committed 5 June against the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the RF people’s deputies. Therefore, although still several days ago 12 June, 17 June, and finally 20 June were named as the possible date for a summit meeting on the ChF, such a meeting will hardly be held at these times. But this means that the situation in Crimea will be so aggravated that it will go out of control altogether.
Second. Neither president is very welcome at the main base of the ChF, as in other Crimean cities. Of the President of Russian they openly say, “Yel’tsin threw us all under the bus [sdal] !”. It curious, also, that on 25 April, when a not unknown referendum was being held in Russia a Sevastopol’ meeting of representatives of unions of citizens voted at their own risk on all four questions of the Russian referendum, and added two of their own. The results: 99.19% rejected trust in the President of Russia; 100% did not approve his socioeconomic policy; 99.73% favored an early election for President of Russia; and only 7.29% favored early elections for people’s deputies. On the two questions of their own: “Do you consider it necessary to abolish the moratorium on the all-Crimean referendum and set a date to hold it?” and “Do you think that the city of Sevastopol’ should be the main base of the Black Sea Fleet under the jurisdiction of Russia?” gained a hundred-percent favorable result. All this not only reflects the now-dominant mood among the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, but also shows that they are by no means ready to agree with any result of the planned summit meeting.
Moreover, it is like the Russian President has for now nothing special to bring to a meeting with L. Kravchuk.
In fact, the Ukrainian side, for example, is proposing to move the main base of the ChF from Sevastopol’ to Novorossiysk. Moreover, that with this very fact a very powerful blow will be dealt the national self-consciousness of all the people of Russia who view Sevastopol’ as a holy national place for which much blood has been shed. There cannot be a discussion of such a transfer, as Admiral F. Gromov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, has justly noted. Even if because in the next 50 years by virtue of certain conditions it is simply impossible to create all the necessary infrastructure for the Fleet in a new place.
The Ukrainian side is also proposing another option – to hand Sevastopol’ over to Russia on lease for a certain period. Such an alternative as a interim [alternative], possibly, could suit the Russian side in certain conditions. But the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine itself under the pressure of nationalistic forces categorically objects to this, and the current Ukrainian regime would hardly be able, what more hardly wants, to overcome the resistance of the Ministry.
The Ukrainian side, not venturing to publicly renounce the Yalta Agreement, made a proposal during the visit of A. Kozyrev to Kiev to begin its practical realization by dividing the ships of the ChF between the sides over a year. But when this is done it remains unclear how things are to be with the main thing, with the shore infrastructure. But Russia obviously might not agree with such an approach.
And, finally, the set of questions concerning the status and social status of servicemen presents a most serious problem: how and according to what regulations are they to serve, advance through the career ladder, and how should there be decided the problems of citizenship of they themselves and their family members (according to the data of sociological surveys about 30% of the officers and chiefs of the Fleet are ready to become citizens of Russia and about 60% to have dual citizenship), housing, monetary and other allowances, and pension support. The government of Russia, like, however, the government of Ukraine, has not yet found adequate answers to all these questions which are vitally important for the Black Sea Fleet sailors.
And all the same the search for reasonable compromises for the problems of the ChF which would suit both Russia and Ukraine are necessary. On would think that the RF Supreme Soviet is capable of getting involved, especially if the leadership of the Supreme Soviet manages to step up the activity of the commission headed by Ye. K. Pudovkin, which was created to consider the problems of the ChF at the 7th Congress of People’s Deputies, but unfortunately no practical results of its work are yet evident.
Expert of the analytical group
[signature] (Yu. Babich)
8 June 1993